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Abstract
This paper examines a remedy for a defect in existing accounts of public risk perceptions. The accounts in
question feature two dynamics: the affect heuristic, which emphasizes the impact of visceral feelings on
information processing; and the cultural cognition thesis, which describes the tendency of individuals to form
beliefs that reflect and reinforce their group commitments. The defect is the failure of these two dynamics,
when combined, to explain the peculiar selectivity of public risk controversies: despite their intensity and
disruptiveness, such controversies occur less frequently than the affect heuristic and the cultural cognition
thesis seem to predict. To account for this aspect of public risk perceptions, the paper describes a model that
adds the phenomenon of culturally antagonistic memes – argumentative tropes that fuse positions on risk
with contested visions of the best life. Arising adventitiously, antagonistic memes transform affect and cultural
cognition from consensus-generating, truth-convergent influences on information processing into conflictual,
identity-protective ones. The paper supports this model with experimental results involving perceptions of the
risk of the Zika virus: a general sample of US subjects, whose cultural orientations were measured with the
Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales, formed polarized affective reactions when exposed to information that
was pervaded with antagonistic memes linking Zika to global warming; when exposed to comparable
information linking Zika to unlawful immigration, the opposing affective stances of the subjects flipped in
direction. Normative and prescriptive implications of these results are discussed.
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This paper examines a remedy for a defect in existing accounts of public risk
perceptions. The accounts in question feature two dynamics: the affect heuristic,
which emphasizes the impact of visceral feelings on information processing; and
the cultural cognition thesis, which describes the tendency of individuals to form
beliefs that reﬂect and reinforce their group commitments. The defect is the fail-
ure of these two dynamics, when combined, to explain the peculiar selectivity of
public risk controversies: despite their intensity and disruptiveness, such contro-
versies occur less frequently than the affect heuristic and the cultural cognition
thesis seem to predict. To account for this aspect of public risk perceptions, the
paper describes a model that adds the phenomenon of culturally antagonistic
memes – argumentative tropes that fuse positions on risk with contested visions
of the best life. Arising adventitiously, antagonistic memes transform affect and
cultural cognition from consensus-generating, truth-convergent inﬂuences on
information processing into conﬂictual, identity-protective ones. The paper
supports this model with experimental results involving perceptions of the risk
of the Zika virus: a general sample of US subjects, whose cultural orientations
were measured with the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales, formed polarized
affective reactions when exposed to information that was pervaded with antago-
nistic memes linking Zika to global warming; when exposed to comparable
information linking Zika to unlawful immigration, the opposing affective stances
of the subjects ﬂipped in direction. Normative and prescriptive implications of
these results are discussed.
Keywords: risk perception; affect heuristic; cultural cognition; Zika virus
1. The strange world of public risk controversy
The landscape of public risk perceptions is dominated by two opposing features:
pockets of cultural polarization on a very small number of putative hazards; and the
absence of conﬂict over a vast expanse of the same. Variance in cultural conﬂict
across and within societies highlights the dissonance of the juxtaposition. For exam-
ple, at the very time the US general public was rebelling against universal adminis-
tration of a vaccine to protect adolescent school girls from the human papilloma
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virus, a sexually transmitted disease that causes cancer, they were placidly assenting
to mandatory vaccination of the same girls to protect them from hepatitis-B, another
cancer-causing sexually transmitted disease (Kahan 2013a). GM food risks bitterly
divide people in France and numerous other European nations (Sato 2007);
Americans, in contrast, don’t even realize that 75% of the food stuffs on their super-
market shelves contain them (Hallman, Cuite, and Morin 2013) and prefer regula-
tory decisions be left to experts (McFadden and Lusk 2016). Public fears crippled
the nuclear industry in the US in the 1980s; French pride in this technology has
made nuclear energy that society’s primary source of power (Slovic et al. 2000).
What accounts for these patterns?
No doubt many things (Renn and Rohrmann 2000). But in this paper we exam-
ine a particular dynamic that can help explain the advent of adventitious forms of
political conﬂict over risk: culturally antagonistic memes.
This explanation doesn’t supplant but rather supplements and integrates two
others understood to be central to public conﬂict over risk. The affect heuristic refers
to the gravitational force individuals’ visceral feelings exert on their appraisals of
risk information (Finucane et al. 2000). Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of
individuals to form risk perceptions that reﬂect and reinforce their group commit-
ments (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2015). Culturally antagonistic memes – highly
suggestive, highly inﬂammatory argumentative tropes that fuse risks to contested
understandings of the best way to live – knit the two together in a fashion that
predictably generates a crazy-quilt patchwork of risk controversies (cf. Toplak and
Stanovich 2003; Stanovich and West 2007).
We furnish support for this theory with evidence from an original experiment
involving a novel and as-yet non-polarizing risk source: the Zika virus. The experi-
ment found that exposing a large sample of ordinary members of the US general
public to materials redolent with antagonistic memes excited opposing affective
states among members of diverse cultural groups, whose members thereafter dis-
played biased formation of beliefs about the virus’s dangers.
After a short background discussion, we describe the design and results of the
study. Because knowledge of such dynamics can and should inform practice
(Jamieson and Hardy 2014), we conclude with a discussion of the implications of
this study and practice of risk communication.
2. Two dynamics and a missing link
2.1. In general
The motivation for the study reported in this paper was to improve upon a model of
public risk perceptions that is powerful but manifestly incomplete. That model con-
sists of two dynamics: the affect heuristic, and the cultural cognition thesis.
One might assume that how people feel about a potential source of danger – a
gun, for example, or a nuclear power plant – reﬂects their weighing of its perceived
costs and beneﬁts. The affect heuristic, however, stands this view on its head. In the
main, emotional appraisals aren’t a consequence of the signiﬁcance people give to
information about societal risks; rather they are the source of it, shaping the effect they
assign to information on the risk source’s potential consequences (Slovic et al. 2004).
Indeed, the impact of affect on risk perceptions is not conﬁned to cost–beneﬁt
evidence. It extends to all manner of information, including the weight of expert
opinion, trust of regulators, and the efﬁcacy of policy interventions (Slovic et al.
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2004; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011).
Psychometrically, all such judgments are best understood as separate indicators or
measures of a latent (that is, unobserved) pro- or con-attitude (Romer and Hennessy
2007).
The cultural cognition thesis posits that values are cognitively prior to fact on
contested societal risks (Kahan et al. 2006). It is dissonant to believe that what one
views as noble is in fact dangerous, and what is base benign. It is also hazardous,
socially, to form risk perceptions at odds with those of people with whom one shares
close social ties: precisely because their perceptions of what’s virtuous and vicious
are likely to be highly correlated with their perceptions of what’s beneﬁcial and
harmful, a person who forms deviant risk perceptions is likely to be viewed as
morally deviant (Douglas 1966), and thus denied the beneﬁts, psychic and material,
that ﬂow from close social ties (Sherman and Cohen 2002).
The affect heuristic and cultural cognition thesis complement one another. The
former says we should expect individuals’ perceptions of facts to cohere with their
feelings about a risk source but does not tell us whether we should expect those feel-
ings to be positive or negative. Similarly, in attributing risk perceptions to individu-
als’ feelings, the affect heuristic does not furnish an explanation for why those
feelings, and the resulting perceptions of risk, vary systematically across groups.
The cultural cognition thesis ﬁlls in these gaps. Group values invest objects (for
example, guns), actions (the termination of a pregnancy), or states of affairs
(industrialization) with social meanings the valence of which determines whether
group members’ affective appraisals are positive or negative. When groups attach
opposing meanings to one and the same risk source, they will form opposingly
valenced affective orientations, and thus opposingly valenced information-processing
biases, toward it (Peters and Slovic 1996; Slovic and Peters 1998; Peters, Burraston,
and Mertz 2004).
The affect heuristic also makes a vital contribution to the cultural cognition of
risk. In effect, the former supplies the latter with a set of individual-level cognitive
mechanisms that plausibly link cultural afﬁliations and related sensibilities to infor-
mation processing. Without these, there would be nothing to connect cultural iden-
tity to risk perceptions but the black box functionalism that mars numerous other
theories of group inﬂuence on individual belief and preferences (Elster 1989; Balkin
1998; Kahan 2012).
We will call this conception of how the affect heuristic and cultural cognition ﬁt
together the AH-CCT Model. This model supplies a powerful explanatory frame-
work; empirical studies have linked the processes it describes to numerous risk con-
ﬂicts, from ones over the reality of climate change to the consequences of gun
control to the safety of nuclear power (Kahan 2010, 2012).
Nevertheless, the model is also manifestly incomplete. Among the things it
doesn’t account for is why in fact there are so few of the types of conﬂicts that it
appears to explain.
In any modern, pluralistic liberal democracy, the number of cases in which indi-
viduals of diverse identities polarize are swamped by the number in which they do
not. There is no meaningful level of public conﬂict in the US, for example, overex-
posure to the magnetic ﬁelds of high-power transmission lines, the safety of medical
X-rays, or the ill-health effects of smoking, just to name a few. No cultural group in
the US of any meaningful size is up in arms over use of nanotechnology in con-
sumer products, GM food stuffs, or mad cow disease (Kahan 2015a, forthcoming-a).
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But one could easily imagine these risks exciting intense and intensely opposed
affective resonances across diverse cultural groups. Indeed, with respect to many of
them cultural conﬂict either once did exist in the US or now does elsewhere
(Gusﬁeld 1993; Gaskell, Bauer et al. 1999; Nathanson 1999; Slovic et al. 2000;
Ferrari 2009).
If the affect heuristic and cultural cognition are so pervasive, why are public
conﬂicts over risk so few and far between? Obviously, there cannot plausibly be
conﬂicts over each and every societal risk, but there could, in any given society at
any given time, be substantially more than there are.
Actually, AH-CCT can easily be used to construct an explanation for the relative
tranquility of public attitudes toward risk, too. On this account, the affect heuristic
and cultural cognition are understood to be fonts of public consensus, not dissensus.
Individuals need to accept more science than they can understand. To get the
beneﬁts of what science knows requires them to become experts not in all the vari-
ous domains of science that touch on their welfare – something that it is impossible
for them to do – but instead to become experts at recognizing valid science (Keil
2003, 2010, 2012). They do this through pattern recognition – a preconscious
faculty of perception that assimilates particular instances of a putative object
(Margolis 1987, 1996) – here, scientiﬁc expertise, or the work of scientiﬁc experts –
to an inventory of prototypes acquired through experience.
In order for pattern recognition to perform this or any other task, however, it
must be appropriately calibrated. That is, it must, through preconscious mechanisms,
make its presence felt when the occasion arises, and appropriately orient individuals
with respect to the object being classiﬁed (Stanovich 2009, 2011).
Cultural cognition and the affect heuristic can be seen as working in tandem to
guide this process. Cultural cognition supplies individuals with the psychic incentive
necessary to immerse themselves in a rich source of expertise prototypes – the ones
latent in the interactions of their cultural groups. The affect heuristic, on this
account, is what makes the sort of tacit knowledge acquired in this way capable of
suppling orienting guidance: by summoning it when the occasion is apt, and by
motivating action consistent with it (Peters, Lipkus and Diefenbach 2006; Evans
et al. 2015). Admittedly, this form of affective orientation originates in discrete, rela-
tively insular sets of social interactions among members of like-minded groups. But
no group of any size would long survive (that is, persist as a meaningful source of
orientating guidance) were it structured in a manner that tended consistently to mis-
lead its members on forms of decision-relevant science essential to their welfare.
Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that a system of parallel cultural
certiﬁcation of knowledge will endow diverse citizens with largely convergent
affective intuitions on which forms of scientiﬁc evidence are valid and which not
(Kahan 2015b).
This model of how the affect heuristic and cultural cognition relate to risk per-
ception is also plausible. But the incompleteness of this conception of AH-CCT
reciprocates the incompleteness of the ﬁrst: what now needs to be explained is why
diverse groups don’t always converge. Something is missing – without which the
AH-CCT model is in danger of explaining everything and hence nothing. The
missing piece that helps the AH-CCT model avoid this ﬂaw, we submit, consists of
culturally antagonistic memes.
The surmise that memes are a ‘missing link’ that alters the import of critical rea-
soning dispositions has been suggested by Stanovich and colleagues (Toplak and
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Stanovich 2003, 2007, 2008; Macpherson and Stanovich 2007). Dispositions such
as actively open-minded thinking and cognitive reﬂection consist precisely in the
tendency to self-consciously interrogate strongly held beliefs, including those associ-
ated with membership in groups. But researchers have found that these dispositions
exert such an effect only unevenly, and in fact can sometimes be associated with the
aggravation of ‘myside bias’ – the tendency to selectively credit information in a
manner that presupposes the truth of one’s own views on contested matters.
Stanovich and West (2007, 241) have suggested that ‘an explanation. … might be
found by combining some concepts from the emerging science of memetics – the
science of the epidemiology of idea-sized units called memes. … –with dual process
theor[ies]’ of cognition. On this account, ‘it is not people who are characterized by
more or less myside bias but beliefs that differ in the degree of belief bias they
engender’ (Stanovich and West 2008, 159).
Our account builds on this conjecture. ‘Memes’ refer to ideas and practices that
enjoy wide circulation and arouse self-reinforcing forms of attention as well as spon-
taneous adaptation and elaboration (Balkin 1998; Blackmore 2000). A small subset
of these sorts self-replicating ideas and practices, the ones we call ‘culturally antago-
nistic memes’ refer to highly evocative, highly inﬂammatory argumentative tropes
used by members of one group to stigmatize another.
When they ﬁgure in debates over risk, these contempt-pervaded tropes invest
positions on them with affective resonances symbolic of opposing groups’ values or
identities. In the resulting discourse climate, individuals will come to perceive risk
regulation as ‘express[ing] the public worth of one subculture’s norms relative to
those of others, demonstrating which cultures have legitimacy and public domina-
tion’ and thereby ‘enhnanc[ing] the social status of groups carrying the afﬁrmed cul-
ture and degrad[ing] groups carrying that which is condemned as deviant’ (Gusﬁeld
1968, 59). Conducted in the idiom of instrumental consequences, the stances diverse
citizens adopt on which activities genuinely threaten society and which policies truly
mitigate the attendant dangers become rhetorical subterfuges in an ‘ongoing debate
about the ideal society’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 36).
This process is effected through a decisive switch in the sort of information
processing that is characteristic of the AH-CCT model. From a reliable and consen-
sus-generating guide to valid decision-relevant science, the affective heuristic and
cultural cognition at this point combine to generate a divisive, non-truth-convergent
source of identity-protective motivated cognition (Hastorf and Cantril 1954; Lord,
Ross, and Lepper 1979; Sherman and Cohen 2006; Kahan 2010; Greene 2013; Jost,
Hennes, and Lavine 2013).1
By fusing contending positions on a risk or like facts to opposing group identi-
ties, antagonistic memes effectively transform positions on them into badges of
membership in, and loyalty to, competing groups. Because this state of affairs pits
opposing groups’ knowledge-certiﬁcation systems against one another, the forms of
information-processing associated with cultural cognition and the affect heuristic
will under these conditions necessarily lose their power to generate truth-convergent
forms of consensus across them.
This switch will not cause such information processing to abate, however. There
is rarely any personal action that an individual can take that will affect the level of
danger that a societal risk poses to him or anyone he cares about; his decisions as a
consumer, voter, or participant in public debate won’t matter enough, for example,
to affect the course of climate change, or the regulation of fracking, or the siting of
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nuclear waste facility. In contrast, such an individual’s personal behavior, including
the attitudes he evinces on issues infused with social meanings, will typically have
tremendous signiﬁcance for the impressions that others form of his character (Lessig
1995; Sherman and Cohen 2002). As a result, it will be individually rational, if
collectively disastrous, for individuals to form habits of mind that reliably produce
identity-afﬁrming rather than accurate ones when societal risks become infused with
meanings that divide their groups from others (Kahan 2015b).
Indeed, these habits of mind will become seamlessly interwoven into the capaci-
ties essential for assessing scientiﬁc information. ‘Motivated system 2 reasoning’
refers to the tendency of individuals to use their proﬁciency in numeracy, cognitive
reﬂection, and science comprehension to ferret out and credit identity-congruent
evidence and explain away the rest (Kahan, forthcoming-b). Much as a virus does to
the genetic material of an otherwise healthy cell, identity-protective cognition
effectively insinuates itself into reasoning dispositions essential to recognizing the
best available evidence (Kahan 2013b; Kahan et al., forthcoming). Their cognitive
faculties having been redirected in this fashion, the individuals most adept in these
forms of reasoning will end up the most polarized on culturally contentions risks
(Hamilton 2011; Hamilton, Cutler, and Schaefer 2012; Kahan et al. 2012).
On this account, identity-protective cognition is thus not a not a natural out-
growth of but rather a pathological deformation of the processes associated with the
AH-CCT model. The trigger of this pathology, moreover, is the advent of culturally
antagonistic memes (Figure 1).
Affect 
+/-
Policy
efficacy
perceived
benefit
perceived
cost
[other facts]
cultural 
worldview
antagonistic
memes
Figure 1. AH-CCT model and antagonistic memes.
Notes: Due to the affect heuristic, all facts relating to risk perception – including expected
beneﬁts and costs, and the efﬁcacy of risk regulation – are posited to be caused by a generic
affective orientation. Psychometrically, they are indicators of a latent affective disposition or
orientation toward the putative risk source. According to the cultural cognition thesis, cul-
tural commitments determine the valence – positive or negative – of affect in relation to the
risk source. These dynamics can but need not generate identity-protective cognition; whether
they will depends on whether, as a result of antagonistic memes, positions on the putative
risk source become entangled in opposing cultural social meanings that make adherence to
competing beliefs status enhancing for members of opposing groups.
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2.2. A concrete illustration
Many persistently contested science issues ﬁt this pattern. But we will focus on one
that we believe is particularly well suited for illustration: the US experience with the
HPV vaccine.
The HPV vaccine confers (near-perfect) immunity to the human papilloma virus,
an extremely common sexually transmitted disease that causes cervical cancer. The
vaccine also has the distinction of being the only childhood immunization recom-
mended for universal administration by the US Centers for Disease Control that is
not now on the schedule of mandatory school-enrollment immunizations in the Uni-
ted States. Legislative proposals to add it were defeated in dozens of states in the
years from 2007 to 2008 as a result of intense political controversy over the safety
and effectiveness of the vaccine (Kahan 2013a).
Although the proposal to add the HPV vaccine to the list of mandatory vaccina-
tions divided the public along predictable lines, the conﬂict over it was in fact not
inevitable. Only a few years before nearly every state had endorsed the CDC’s pro-
posal for universal administration of the HBV vaccine, which likewise confers
immunity for a sexually transmitted disease, hepatitis-B, that causes cancer. The
HBV vaccine is now given in infancy, but at that time it was an adolescent shot, just
like the HPV vaccine. During the years in which legislative battles were raging over
the latter vaccine, nationwide vaccination rates for the former were well over 90%
(Kahan 2013a).
Like every other childhood vaccine that preceded it, the HBV vaccine was con-
sidered and approved for inclusion in state universal-immunization schedules by
non-political public health agencies delegated this expert task by state legislatures.
The vast majority of parents thus learned of the vaccine for the ﬁrst time when con-
sent to administer it was sought from their pediatricians, trusted experts who advised
them the vaccine was a safe addition to the array of prophylactic treatments for
keeping their children healthy. Just as important, regardless of who these parents
were – Republican or Democrat, devout evangelical or atheist – they were all
afforded ample evidence that parents just like them were getting their kids vacci-
nated for HBV. This is a science communication environment in which the AH-CCT
model can be expected to generate largely convergent affective reactions across all
groups – exactly the outcome that was observed.
The HPV’s vaccine path to public awareness, in contrast, was much more
treacherous. Seeking to establish a dominant position in the market before the
approval of a competing shot, the manufacturer of the HPV vaccine orchestrated a
nationwide campaign to establish immunization mandates by statutes enacted by
state legislatures. What was normally a routine, nonpolitical decision – the adminis-
trative updating of states’ mandatory-vaccination immunization schedules – thus
became a high-proﬁle, highly partisan dispute. People became acquainted with the
vaccine not during visits to their pediatricians’ ofﬁce but while viewing political
news outlets. There they were bombarded with reports on the ‘slut shot’ (Taormino
2006) and ‘virgin vaccine’ (Page 2006) for school girls, a framing enabled by the
manufacturer’s decision to seek fast-track FDA approval of a women’s-only shot as
part of company’s plan to vault over the conventional, less speedy, depoliticized
administrative-approval process (Gollust et al. 2015).
These media stories and resulting social media reaction were replete with what
we are referring to as ‘culturally antagonistic memes’ (Figure 2). ‘Trust us: Vioxx,
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Now Gardasil,’ declared a viral internet feature that mocked the manufacturer’s own
advertising campaign. ‘HPV vaccine: Republicans prove themselves morons once
again,’ sneered liberal commentators (2011). ‘They value your virginity more than
your life,’ another righteously intoned; ‘there was a time when only the loony left
believed that the loony right favored death over sex; not any more’ (Goodman
2015). Individualist-oriented commentators retorted: ‘Let’s use teenage girls as lab
rats for a monopoly’ (Erickson 2011).
These are exactly the conditions one would expect to fuse a risk issue to antago-
nistic social meanings, thereby triggering identity-protective cognition on the vac-
cine’s risks and beneﬁts (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2013; Fowler and Gollust
2015). Studies conﬁrmed that exactly that happened (Gollust et al. 2010; Kahan,
Braman, Cohen, et al. 2010).
3. Study: Zika and culturally antagonistic memes
3.1. Why Zika
The aim of this study was to experimentally model the impact that scholars have
speculated memes have in redirecting critical reasoning dispositions and that we sur-
mise explains the patchwork quality of public conﬂicts over risks HPV and HBV
vaccines. The focus of the study was the impact of culturally antagonistic-meme
generating communications on the perceived risks of the Zika virus.
We selected the Zika virus for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that we are conﬁdent
there isn’t currently meaningful cultural dissensus on Zika at the current time. For
over ﬁve months, the Annenberg Public Policy Center (2016a) has been tracking US
public opinion on the disease. Attention early on spiked and then leveled off, and is
now rising again; knowledge about the health effects of the virus and about effective
means of self-protection have proven uneven; certain misunderstandings about the
link between the virus and microcephaly have persisted, albeit at modest levels
(Annenberg Public Policy Center 2016b).
But nothing in this mix varies meaningfully with ideology, religion, or like forms
of cultural identity. There is reason to be apprehensive about the speed with which
members of the public are progressing in their understanding of key facts about the
virus. But the evidence suggests that culturally diverse members of the public are
progressing in unison, much in the manner one would expect under the ‘normal,’
nonpathological process contemplated by the AH-CCT Model (Figure 1).
Figure 2. Culturally antagonistic memes: the HPV vaccine.
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At the same time, there has been a steady accumulation of communications tying
the Zika health threat to already culturally charged issues (Figure 3). The voice of
public health ofﬁcials furnishing the public with precautionary advice is only one in
a chorus, whose other members include a collection of advocacy groups all seeking
to leverage public anxiety over Zika into greater attention to their special cause
(see Figure 3).
Among these are anti-immigrant groups. These actors suggest that the spread of
Zika is likely to be accelerated by undocumented aliens as well as lawful immigrants
from Zika-affected regions. ‘Latin America’s Zika virus is the latest undocumented
immigrant to hit our shores,’ one commentator caustically notes (Malkin 2016). It’s
obvious from the ‘available evidence’ that ‘open borders contribute to the vulnera-
bility of the United States to the virus’ (Corsi 2016). ‘People from Central and South
America, ground zero for Zika and other infectious diseases including tuberculosis,
dengue, Chagas, Chikungunya and schistosomiasis, make up nearly 15 percent of
the illegal-immigrant population in the U.S.’ (Malkin 2016). ‘[A] drain on our econ-
omy, a peril to our national security, and a drag on our souls,’ illegal immigrants are
now ‘hazardous to our health, thanks to sloppy US immigration laws acting as incu-
bators for diseases once foreign to North America – like the untreatable Zika virus’
(Abruzzo 2016).
Climate change advocates have also latched onto Zika. ‘Zika is the kind of thing
we’ve been ranting about for 20 years,’ one observes. ‘We should’ve anticipated it.
Whenever the planet has faced a major climate change event, man-made or not, spe-
cies have moved around and their pathogens have come into contact with species
with no resistance’ (Milman 2016). Now ‘thanks to climate change’ Zika could
‘soon enjoy a greater reach’ (Mercer 2016), ‘spread[ing] deeper’ into currently
secure areas of the U.S. (Gillis 2016). Of all the ‘tragedies stemming from global
warming,’ including the ‘ﬂoods and droughts and storms, the failed harvests and
forced migrations, . . . no single item on the list seems any more horrible than the
emerging news from South America about the newly prominent Zika disease’
(McKibben 2016). ‘We need to face up to the fact that pushing the limits of the pla-
net’s ecology has become dangerous in novel ways.’ ‘The Republicans are in denial
about climate change, but in the real world, we can feel it. … It’s also an invitation
Figure 3. Culturally antagonistic memes: Zika.
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for breeding mosquitoes and putting Americans at risk all across the United States’
(Johnson 2016).
The situation presented, then, furnishes an ideal one to extend previous research.
The tropes that inform advocacy material linking Zika to other culturally contested
issues are replete with the accusatory and resentment-focusing tropes featured in
highly polarized risk disputes. Yet in no previous study has there been an opportu-
nity to test the impact of such tropes in relation to an issue not already the subject
of at least modest contestation.
It is quite possible, of course, that the explanation for the patchwork of contesta-
tion and tranquility that forms the fabric of public risk perception is some as-yet
undetected factor intrinsic to particular risk sources. It is perfectly plausible to
believe, too, that deeper, historical inﬂuences render a particular risk source either
impervious or distinctly amenable to controversy of a particular form, in particular
societies.
But through an appropriately constructed study, one can test the alternative
hypothesis that it is the contingent advent of exposure to culturally antagonistic
memes that triggers such conﬂict, and accounts for its complexion and intensity. The
study we conducted was aimed at furnishing evidence relevant to assessing the rela-
tive plausibility of these alternative conjectures.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Sample
The study was administered to a large (N = 2400) sample of US adults. Subjects
were recruited by YouGov, a public research ﬁrms which conducts online surveys
Figure 4. Cultural cognition of thesis.
Notes: Drawing on a typology proposed by Douglas (1970), the cultural cognition thesis
(Slovic 2010) posits that conﬂicts over risk perceptions reﬂect cultural predispositions toward
the legitimacy of socially stratiﬁed forms of authority (‘Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism’) and
the relative prerogatives of individuals and collectivities (‘Individualism vs. Communitarian-
ism’). Observational and experimental research based on the Cultural Cognition Worldview
scales have established relationships between the cultural ‘ways of life’ associated with the
scheme and environmental other societal risks (Xue et al. 2014).
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and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and
commercial customers (including political campaigns).2 Fifty-seven percent of the
sample members were female; 73% were white, 10% were African-American, and
9% were Hispanic. The average age was 48 (SD = 17). The median educational
attainment was ‘some college,’ and the median income was $40,000 to $49,000.
Thirty-ﬁve percent of the sample identiﬁed as ‘Democrats,’ 26% as Republicans,
and 43% as ‘Independents.’ The study was administered from 22 April to 11 May
2016.
3.2.2. Experimental3
Subjects were assigned to one of three conditions: ‘Public Health,’ ‘Immigrant’ and
‘Global Warming.’ Subjects in all three read a news story on Zika public health
risks. Patterned on a Centers for Disease Control advisory (2016), the stories pre-
sented identical, true information on Zika. The stories explained that ‘an epidemic
of Zika infections in Brazil has been linked to a spike in microcephaly, a birth defect
that results in stunted brain and head sizes in newborns.’ The stories also summa-
rized research ﬁndings indicating that ‘Zika might cause microcephaly in the babies
of women infected during pregnancy.’ Finally, they all reported CDC-issued ‘guide-
lines aimed at protecting pregnant women from exposure to the virus’:
• Men with conﬁrmed cases of the virus or who have had symptoms of the virus
are now advised to wait at least six months after their symptoms begin before
having unprotected sex. …
• Women and men without symptoms who have traveled to or had sex with
someone who has traveled to a Zika-infected area are now advised to wait at
least eight weeks after possible exposure to the virus before the woman tries to
become pregnant, according to the guidelines.
• Men who have traveled to a Zika-infected area who have not had symptoms of
the virus are now advised to abstain from sex or use a condom for at least
eight weeks after returning from the area.
The public health risk content was underscored by the headline in the Public Health
condition story (‘Public Impact of Zika Grows’) and by the common subheadline in
each condition (‘CDC updates Zika advice for sex and pregnancy’).
The headlines, leads and introductory material in the Global Warming and
Immigrant condition versions were patterned on real communications linking the
spread of Zika to climate change and illegal immigration. Thus, in Global Warming
(headline: ‘Global Warming Could Spread Zika, Group Warns’), the lead stated,
We can now add still another danger to the litany of risks – coastal ﬂooding, droughts,
destructive hurricanes, reduced agricultural production – attributable to global warm-
ing: the accelerated spread of Zika, the mosquito-borne virus suspected of causing
infants to be born with abnormally small heads in Brazil and other Latin American
countries.
The story attributed this conclusion to
a report issued today by Save our Planet (SOP), a Washington, D.C., based group
dedicated to promoting policies aimed at counteracting the impact of human activity
on climate change.
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… ‘[W]ith climate change, plants and animals that thrive in warmer habitats are going
to move to previously cooler areas, including those in the continental United States,’
Carlsmith explained at a Washington, D.C. news conference. ‘Mosquitos carrying the
Zika virus can be expected to do the same.’
The story in Immigrant (headline: ‘Inﬂux of Immigrants Could Spread Zika, Group
Warns’) used a parallel structure. ‘We can now add still another danger to the litany
of harms – increased unemployment, higher crime rates, crushing tax burdens to
cover the exploding demand for welfare beneﬁts – attributable to the ﬂood of illegal
immigrants: the accelerated spread of Zika, the mosquito-borne virus suspected of
causing infants to be born with abnormally small heads in Brazil and other Latin
American countries.’ The story then went on to describe a ‘a report issued today by
Protect America’s Borders (PAB), a Washington, D.C., based group dedicated to
promoting policies aimed at reducing eligibility for legal immigration to the United
States and increasing governmental efforts to combat illegal entry into the country.’
The spokesman for the group was quoted as stating that ‘as infected Mexicans,
Columbians, Brazilians, and others come to the U.S., Americans will inevitably join
the ranks of people who get this disease and whose babies are then born with this
horriﬁc deformity.’
3.2.3. Cultural worldviews
Subjects’ cultural outlooks were measured with the Cultural Cognition Worldview
scales (Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory 2011). Patterned on Mary
Douglas’s group–grid typology (Douglas 1970; Rayner 1992), the scales use a two-
dimensional framework to characterize preferences about how society and other
groups should be organized (Figure 4). One dimension, ‘hierarchy-egalitarianism,’
assesses attitudes toward social stratiﬁcation in status and roles (e.g. ‘We need to
dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of
color, and men and women’; ‘society as a whole has become too soft and femi-
nine’). The other, ‘individualism–communitarianism,’ assesses attitudes toward the
relative prerogatives and obligations of individuals, on the one hand, and those of
collectivities, on the other (e.g. ‘The government interferes far too much in our
everyday lives’; ‘the government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if
that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals’).
The Cultural Cognition Worldview scales were developed to implement
Douglas’s proposal (1999) to link the Cultural Theory of Risk (Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982) the Psychometric Paradigm (Slovic 2000). Their psychometric
properties and explanatory power have been shown to make them superior to a wide
variety of alternatives used to examine the impact of cultural predispositions on per-
ceptions on risk perceptions (Xue et al. 2014).
We used the 12-item short form (Kahan 2012) (Appendix A). Two, six-item
orthogonal factors – the loadings for which appropriately reﬂected the ‘hierarchy-
egalitarianism’ and ‘individualism–communitarianism’ worldview dimensions – were
extracted from the 12-item battery. Factor scores – ‘Hfac’ for hierarchy-egalitarianism
(α = 0.88), and ‘Ifac’ for individualism–communitarianism (α = 0.81) – were used to
measure the posited latent dispositions. Although the measures are continuous and
treated as such in multivariate analyses, one can for expositional purposes refer to
individuals as ‘Hierarch individualists,’ ‘Hierarch communitarians,’ ‘Egalitarian indi-
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vidualists,’ and ‘Egalitarian communitarians,’ respectively, based on their scores in
relation to the means of the two cross-cutting scales.
3.2.4. Zika beliefs and attitudes
We also measured subjects’ beliefs about and attitudes toward Zika with several
batteries of items. The two most important items related to the subjects’ Zika risk
perceptions:
ZIKA_ISRPM. How much risk do you believe the Zika virus poses to human health
in the United States? [0 ‘no risk at all’; 1 ‘Very low risk’; 2 ‘Low risk’; 3 ‘Between
low and moderate risk’; 4 ‘Moderate risk’; 5 ‘Between moderate and high risk’; 6
‘High risk’; 7 ‘Very high risk’]
ZIKAWORRY. How concerned are you that the Zika virus will spread to where you
live?[ 0 ‘not at all concerned’; 1 ‘slightly concerned’; 2 ‘between slightly and moder-
ately concerned’ 3 ‘moderately concerned’ 4 ‘Between moderately and very concerned’
5 ‘very concerned’]
These two items were intended to measure a latent affective disposition toward Zika.
The simple Likert measure of relative risk reﬂected in ZIKA_ISRPM (for ‘Industrial
Strength Risk Perception Measure’) has been validated across a variety of contexts
as a powerful one-item predictor of more particular attitudes and even behaviors, a
quality that vouches for its status as an indicator of the type of generic orientation
associated with the affect heuristic (Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002; Ganzach et al.
2008; Dohmen 2011). It is especially suited for assessing sources of variance in
risk-related affect (Kahan 2015a).
A standard item in the ongoing Annenberg Public Policy Center’s ‘Science
Knowledge Survey’ (2016a), ZIKAWORRY directly solicits an affective appraisal.
Its high degree of covariance with ZIKA_ISRPM (r = 0.71), furnishes grounds for
conﬁdence that both are valid Zika affect indicators. The two were combined to
form a scale, which was labeled ‘ZAFFECT’ (α = 0.80).
Another battery of items required subjects to assess propositions, some true and
some false, relating to the health risks of Zika. Many of these items were ones the
subjects should have been able to answer correctly based on information contained
in the news stories (e.g. disagree or agree, ‘a person can catch Zika from being bit-
ten by a mosquito that is carrying the Zika virus’; ‘public health experts would say’
that ‘a man who has travelled to a location that is currently experiencing a high rate
of Zika infections but who is NOT experiencing symptoms after returning’ cannot
‘infect another person through sexual intercourse’). Other tested general knowledge
of facts not speciﬁcally or explicitly asserted in the stories; (e.g. disagree or agree,
‘A person can catch Zika from sitting next to someone who has been infected by the
Zika virus’; ‘a person can catch Zika from drinking water sprayed with a chemical
used to stop the spread of mosquitoes’). Still others included currently unsupported
propositions related to the experimental stimuli news stories (e.g. ‘Immigrants enter-
ing the United States illegally have caused the spread of the Zika virus to the United
States’; ‘global warming has caused the Zika virus to spread to the United States’).
The 16 items in this battery were combined into a scale, scored with Item Response
Theory, which was designated ZLIT (α = 0.80).
By way of external validation, ZLIT was assessed in relation to subjects’ scores
on the Ordinary Science Intelligence assessment (Kahan 2016). Designed for use in
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the study of risk perception and science communication, OSI measures both the
capacity and the motivation to comprehend scientiﬁc information. ZLIT correlated
positively with OSI (r = 0.45, p < 0.01),4 supporting the inference that ZLIT
measures dispositions related to science-information processing.
Finally, a ‘Zika Policy’ battery was administered. Items in this set used a six-
point oppose–support Likert scale to assess subjects’ endorsement of a variety of
measures to combat infection by the virus and the spread of it generally (e.g. ‘the
release of genetically engineered mosquitos designed to interfere with breeding and
reproducing of Zika-carrying mosquitos’; ‘increased funding for the U.S. Center for
Disease Control to take steps to prevent the spread of Zika in the U.S.’; ‘develop-
ment of a vaccine against infection by the Zika virus’).
The resulting scale, ZPOLICY (α = 0.71) was heavily left skewed. Depending
on how one looks at it, this is fortunate and unfortunate. It is fortunate insofar as it
implies that coming into the study subjects had already formed a strong commitment
to public interventions to combat Zika. It is unfortunate insofar as the low level of
variance in the scale constrained the possibility of explaining individual differences,
within and between conditions.
3.3. Hypotheses
3.3.1. Zika affect
As explained, the motivation for the study was to test the power of culturally antag-
onistic memes to excite identity-protective cognition through its impact on affect
and cultural cognition. The study design was structured to create conditions in which
such an effect would likely reveal itself if in fact this account of how antagonistic
memes operate within the AH-CCT model is correct.
Climate change and immigration are culturally charged issues. Both have been
shown to generate correspondingly polarized perceptions of risk (e.g. Kahan et al.
2016). Advocacy materials of the sort discussed in Section 3.1 and reﬂected in the
stimulus materials for the Global Warming and Immigrant conditions could thus be
expected to excite identity-protective cognition by establishing an affective link
between Zika and these issues.
Accordingly, evidence that the experimental assignment induces cultural polar-
ization in ZAFFECT, an affect measure extracted from risk perception indicators,
would make it more plausible to believe that Zika risk perceptions can be a conduit
of antagonistic memes. By the same token, a ﬁnding of the lack of such an effect
would reduce the plausibility of this concern; such a result would be compatible
with the conjecture that the selectivity of risk conﬂicts is rooted in features intrinsic
to the risk source in question, or in deeper historical and cultural inﬂuences not
readily triggered or modiﬁed by adventitious exposure to particular and particularly
inﬂammatory forms of communication. We will refer to these two predicted results
– polarization conditional on treatment and no such polarization – as the
AM-vulnerability and AM-immunity hypotheses, respectively.
The speciﬁc direction of any effect also bears on the weight of the evidence.
Climate change tends to generate greater concern among individuals as their
worldviews become more egalitarian and communitarian, while immigration tends
to generate greater concern as their worldviews become more hierarchical and indi-
vidualistic (Kahan et al. 2016). So a ﬁnding of opposing patterns of polarization
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along these lines between these two conditions would be supportive of the inference
of a vulnerability of Zika risk perceptions to antagonistic-meme effects.5
This formulation of the inferential strategy assumes that individuals with these
identities will not be polarized in the Public Health Condition, or at least not so
strongly polarized in that condition as in the Global Warming and Immigrant ones.
This surmise seems plausible. So, too, however, does the conjecture that there will
be polarization in the Public Health Condition among individuals who are relatively
individualistic and ones who are relatively communitarian: persons with these out-
looks tend to diverge on the value of public provisioning for collective needs (or at
least on the perception of the necessity and efﬁcacy of such provisioning) (Rayner
1992). They thus might be affectively disposed to form opposing responses to the
information in the Public Health version of the article, in which the expectation of
public interventions is more salient in the lead and not diluted by the inclusion of
other issues with strong cultural resonances.
The inferential value of the evidence, however, does not depend strongly on the
absence of cultural polarization in the Public Health condition. In the event of such
polarization, the AM-vulnerability hypothesis would still predict polarization in Zika
affect conditional on assignment to the Immigrant and Global Warming conditions,
which, for the reasons discussed, should vary in their directional effects.
3.3.2. ZLIT
Identity-protective cognition involves conforming assessments of information to
culturally congruent affective appraisals of a putative risk source. If the AM-
vulnerability hypothesis is correct, then we should observe the signature of this form
of biased information processing in the ZLIT scale. If not, then not.
What effect would count as supportive of the AM-vulnerability hypothesis with
respect to this measure, however, merits attention. ZLIT consists of propositions that
variously assert or deny connections between behaviors and Zika risks. If the sub-
jects are unaffected by identity-protective cognition, ZLIT should register their levels
of knowledge about Zika risks uniformly between conditions. But if the experimen-
tal assignment does trigger identity-protective cognition, we should expect subjects’
knowledge to be distorted by their unconscious motivation to endorse propositions
that afﬁrm their cultural identities and to deny ones that threaten or denigrate their
identities. Accordingly, corroboration of the AM-vulnerability hypothesis would take
the form of a main effect: viz., degradation of ZLIT scores in Global Warming and
Immigrant relative to scores in Public Health.
Such degradation, moreover, should be attributable primarily to between-
condition differences that reﬂect the motivation of subjects to afﬁrm or deny propo-
sitions consistent with their experimentally manipulated affective orientation toward
ZIKA. One would expect, for example, Egalitarian Communitarians to afﬁrm that
‘Global warming has caused the Zika virus to spread to the United States’
(GWSPREAD) and Hierarch Individualists that ‘immigrants entering the United
States illegally have caused the spread of the Zika virus to the United States’
(IMMSPREAD) more readily in the Global Warming and Immigrant conditions,
respectively. Moreover, many (not all) of the ZLIT battery items also reﬂect incor-
rect propositions (or ones incorrect at the time of the study administration; e.g. ‘the
number of cases of babies being born in the United States with abnormally small
heads and brains has increased in recent months’; ‘there is currently an outbreak of
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Zika infections in Europe’; ‘a person can catch Zika from sitting next to someone
who has been infected by the Zika virus’) that one might expect individuals more
readily to afﬁrm when assigned to a condition in which evincing fear was identity-
afﬁrming and to deny when assigned to a condition in which such fear would be
identity-threatening or identity-denigrating.
Borrowing a term from Sunstein (2006), we will refer to this pattern of responses as
‘misfearing.’ As we use the term, ‘misfearing’ does not involve the affective appraisal
of risk per se; indeed, we are skeptical not only of the assertion that affect is inimical to
accurate risk perception generally but of the claim that risk perception uninformed by
affect could ever be appropriately or reliably discerning of true danger, even among
individuals of the highest proﬁciency in conscious, effortful information processing
(Peters, Lipkus, and Diefenbach 2006; Evans et al. 2015; generally Damasio 2010).
We mean by misfearing the condition in which affect becomes unmoored from
the cues that might be expected to encapsulate personal and collective understand-
ings of the physical harm associated with a putative risk source, and instead
becomes responsive to the status threat an individual will endure within an afﬁnity
group if he or she manifests endorsement of a risk claim (Slovic 2000, 2010). A
token of identity-protective cognition, affect-driven information processing will
under these circumstances necessarily generate polarization rather than convergence
on the best available evidence among culturally diverse citizens. However big the
contribution that appropriately calibrated affect makes to activating the processes
that help individuals to discern risk, affect infused in this way with identity-
protective cognition is highly likely to be inimical to their collective well-being
(Kahan and Slovic 2006).
To test this hypothesis, a subset of ZLIT items having this quality – of being
incorrect but likely to attract endorsement disproportionately when fear of Zika is
identity-afﬁrming – were combined into a separate ‘MISFEARING’ scale
(α = 0.76).6 Accordingly, if the AM-vulnerability hypothesis is correct, we should
expect to see evidence of a misfearing effect: that is, a tendency to score higher on
this scale (by answering more items incorrectly) in the experiment condition in
which a higher level of fear is identity-congruent than when it is not. The
AM-immunity hypothesis, in contrast, predicts the absence of such an effect.
The AM-vulnerability hypothesis sees antagonistic memes as triggering a cogni-
tive switch whereby critical reasoning dispositions become identity-convergent
rather than truth-convergent in their operation. Accordingly, the AM-vulnerability
hypothesis posits that the misfearing effect should, perversely, be most intense in
subjects highest in science comprehension.
Again, this inferential strategy assumes that there will be no or minimal polariza-
tion in Public Health. If there is polarization in that condition, however, the compet-
ing hypotheses remain amenable to investigation by comparing whether subjects of
opposing cultural identities vary their responses to items conditional on their
assignment to Global Warming and Immigrant, experimental treatments expected to
generate opposing effects among subjects with Egalitarian Communitarian and
Hierarchical Individualistic identities.
3.3.3. ZIKA_POLICY
For the same reason that one might expect bundling of information on Zika with
contentious cultural issues to crate culturally opposed affective responses to Zika
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risks, so one might expect such a bundling to generate comparable divisions in
comprehension or support for policy-making interventions to reduce the Zika public
health threat. Accordingly, any AM-vulnerability effects in relation to ZIKA_PO-
LICY should track those observed in connection with ZAFFECT. The AM-immu-
nity hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that positions on ZIKA_POLICY will be
unaffected by the experimental assignment.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. ZAFFECT
The experimental assignment had a small main effect on ZAFFECT (Table B1,
Model 1).7 Relative to subjects assigned to Public Health (M = 0.02, SE = 0.03) and
Immigrant (M = 0.07, SE = 0.4), subjects assigned to Global Warming were slightly
less concerned about Zika risks (M = −0.10, SE = 0.04).
The impact conditional on cultural outlooks was more substantial (Figure 5). In
Public Health, Egalitarian Communitarians had the highest ZAFFECT score
(M = 0.25, SE = 0.06), and Hierarchical Individualists the lowest (M = −0.20,
SE = 0.06). Hierarch Communitarians (M = 0.13, SE = 0.06) and Egalitarian Indi-
vidualists (M = −0.07, SE = 0.06) were in between, with scores close to the sample
mean (Figure 6).
Assignment to the Global Warming condition generated a substantial shift in
concern (Figures 5 and 6). The ZAFFECT scores of Hierarch Communitarians
(ΔM = −0.21, ±0.18), Hierarchical Individualists (ΔM = −0.29, ±0.17), and
Hierarchy
Egalitarianism
Individualism Communitarianism
public health
immigrant global warming
ZAFFECT
ZAFFECT ZAFFECT
ZAFFECT
public health
immigrantglobal warming
public health
immigrant
global warmingglobal warming immigrant
public health
Figure 5. Experimental results for ZAFFECT: raw data.
Notes: The impact of the experimental assignment conditional on cultural worldviews can be
gauged by observing within any quadrant the relative density of the observations for each
color-coded condition. For example, the left-leaning skew of the green density plot in the
upper left and the right-leaning skew of the same-colored density plot in the lower right
denote the opposing reactions of Hierarchical Individualists and Egalitarian Communitarians,
respectively, as do the opposing skews of the purple-colored immigrant density distributions.
The experimental impact was less pronounced on Hierarchical Communitarians and
Egalitarian Individualists.
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Egalitarian Individualists (ΔM = −0.08, ±0.16) all declined relative to the scores of
their Public Health counterparts.8 The scores of Egalitarian Communitarians
(ΔM = 0.00, ±0.16) did not change. However, the gap between the typical Egalitar-
ian Communitarian and the typical Hierarchical Individualist – members of groups
that are highly polarized on climate change risks (Kahan et al. 2012) – widened
substantially (ΔM = 0.75, ±0.21) relative to the already sizable gulf between them in
the Public Health condition (ΔM = 0.45, ±0.20).
Assignment to Immigrant produced an even more dramatic effect (Figure 6).
Indeed, Hierarch Individualists and Egalitarian Communitarians ﬂipped in their rela-
tive positions, as the latter’s ZAFFECT score increased by 0.65 (±0.17) and latter’s
dropped by 0.31 (±0.18), nearly a one-standard deviation change relative to their
scores in Global Warming. Hierarch Communitarians’ scores increased by 0.35
(±17), creating a 0.44 (±0.20) gap between them and Egalitarian Individualists,
whose scores in Immigrant did not change materially relative to their scores in
Global Warming (ΔM = −0.01, ±0.17).
3.4.2. ZLIT and misfearing
As explained, ZLIT can be used to measure whether the experimental assignment
affected information processing and belief formation. ZLIT scores were on average
0.12 SD’s (±0.08) lower for subjects assigned to either the Global Warming or the
Immigrant conditions than were the scores of those assigned to Public Health
(Table B2, Model 1).9
Relatively egalitarian and individualistic subjects scored higher than relatively
hierarchical and communitarian ones in all conditions. But cultural worldview scores
did not otherwise vary depending on the experimental assignment (Table B2,
Models 2 & 3).
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Figure 6. Experimental impact for ZAFFECT (z-scores): Multivariate regression analysis.
Notes: Derived from Monte Carlo simulations based on multivariate regression (Table B1,
Model 3). ‘±’ refers to the 2.5 and 97.5‰ boundaries of estimated mean probability density
distributions (King, Tom, and Wittenberg 2000).
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The experimental impact also affected scores on the MISFEARING scale.
Indeed, misfearing effects – the tendency to more readily credit incorrect statements
evincing Zika fear when doing so was hypothesized to be identity-afﬁrming – grew
in tandem with subjects scores on the Ordinary Science Intelligence assessment
(Table B3, Model 4 & Figure 7). For example, the predicted probability that a sub-
ject modestly above average in science comprehension would incorrectly indicate
‘there is currently an outbreak of Zika infections in Europe’ grew 27 percentage
points (±7%) when he or she was assigned to the condition in which Zika fear was
identity-afﬁrming rather than identity-threatening. Equivalent to the effect that
identity-protective cognition has in appropriating faculties of science comprehension
generally (Kahan 2013a; Kahan et al., forthcoming), this pattern reﬂects the
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Figure 7. Misfearing effect.
Notes: Derived by multivariate regression (Table B3, Model 4), Panel A estimates the impact
of the misfearing effect in relation to Egalitarian Communitarian and Hierarchical Individual-
ist subjects’ scores on the Ordinary Science Comprehension assessment. Black bars denote
0.95 conﬁdence intervals. Based on Monte Carlo Simulations of the effect of the experimen-
tal manipulation on the MISFEARING scale, Panels B–D illustrate the magnitude of the
effect: the probability density distribution indicated the increased likelihood that a Hierarchi-
cal Individualist or Egalitarian Communitarian subject who scores either at the mean or one
standard-deviation above the mean on the Ordinary Science Intelligence assessment will
supply the incorrect response to the speciﬁed item conditional on being assigned to an
experimental condition in which Zika fear is posited to be identity-afﬁrming rather than iden-
tity-threatening. No such effect was observed in Hierarchical communitarian or Egalitarian
Individualist subjects. ‘±’ refers to the 2.5 and 97.5‰ boundaries of estimated-mean proba-
bility density distributions (King, Tom, and Wittenberg 2000).
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signature reasoning deformation associated with System 2 motivated reasoning
(Kahan, forthcoming-b).
In the case of a subject modestly above average in science comprehension, the
predicted misfearing effect was 21 percentage points (±6%) for the proposition that
‘an individual who has been infected by the Zika virus will always experience
noticeable symptoms shortly after being infected.’ This result, in particular, illus-
trates the potentially perverse effects of identity-protective cognition on information
processing. Intuitively, this proposition seems to connote a high level of risk. But in
fact, it understates the danger posed by Zika exposure, for it implies that an individ-
ual who is asymptomatic is incapable of transmitting the virus by sexual intercourse,
an error that could result in infection of a woman who is or will become pregnant,
thereby enhancing her risk of giving birth to a microcephalic infant. The impact of
Global Warming in arousing an affective state of risk concern in Egalitarian Com-
munitarians and risk skepticism in Hierarch Individualists, then, paradoxically was
associated with the former crediting and the latter denying a proposition that, if
accepted, would lull individuals into seriously risky personal behavior.
These effects, obviously, are not attributable to the health-related information
subjects in different conditions received. Rather, what they reﬂect is the impact of
the experimental assignment on the predispositions of diverse subjects to selectively
credit or reject information in patterns congruent with the identity-afﬁrming or iden-
tity-denigrating affective resonance induced by the experimental assignment.
3.4.3. ZPOLICY
The affect heuristic posits that support for policies to abate a societal risk, like
perceptions of risk-related facts, are indicators of a generic affective orientation
toward the risk source. Accordingly, the AM-vulnerability hypothesis predicts that
an experimental manipulation that inﬂuences an affective orientation of that sort
should have a parallel impact on support for relevant risk- regulation policies.
No such effect was observed in this study (Table B4). Unlike scores on
ZAFFECT and ZLIT, sample-wide scores on ZPOLICY showed no evidence of
being affected by the experimental manipulation overall. Hierarchical Individualist
subjects were less supportive of public policy interventions than were Egalitarian
Communitarian subjects generally (Table B4, Model 2). But there was no effect on
scores conditional on subjects’ cultural outlooks (Table B4, Model 3), a result in line
with the AM-immunity hypothesis.
4. Implications
The aim of the reported study was to use Zika risk perceptions to model how
culturally antagonistic memes can transform a consensus-generating process of
information processing into a culturally divisive one. The study design pitted two
opposing hypotheses against each other: the AM-vulnerability hypothesis, which
predicted that exposure to communications redolent with culturally antagonistic
memes would generate the indicia of identity-protect cognition; and the AM-immu-
nity hypothesis, which predicted there would be no such effect. We now take stock
of the results, dividing the discussion into positive, normative, and prescriptive
implications.
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4.1. Positive
4.1.1. AM-vulnerability vs. AM-immunity: weighing the evidence
Only modestly divided in the Public Health condition, Hierarchic Individualists and
Egalitarian Communitarians formed highly divergent affective reactions in Global
Warming and Immigrant conditions. In the former condition, Hierarchical Individu-
alists adopted a stance of skepticism toward Zika risks that mirrored their skepticism
toward human-climate change, creating a sizable gulf of concern between them and
their Egalitarian Communitarian rivals. In Immigrant, in contrast, it was the Egalitar-
ian Communitarians who reacted dismissively and the Hierarchical Individuals who
evinced alarm.
The health-risk information that subjects of diverse outlooks received within
each conditions was equivalent. The only thing that varied was the valence of the
argumentative tropes used to tie those risks to others that already excite opposing
affective reactions in individuals of diverse cultural worldviews. The transfer of
these antagonistic affective stances to Zika risks was exactly what the AM-vulnera-
bility hypothesis predicted.
The AM-vulnerability hypothesis also predicted that the experimental treatment
would affect the quality of information processing. It did.
There was a main effect – one independent of cultural worldviews – consisting
in the degradation of ZLIT scores conditional on assignment to the Global Warming
or Immigrant conditions. This is the result one would expect if subjects were uncon-
sciously motivated to assess propositions based not on the strength of the evidence
they were exposed to in the study or had previously encountered but rather on the
congruence of such assertions with the affective orientation that had been induced
by the experimental assignment.
This inference was bolstered by evidence of the tendency of subjects to ‘misfear’
Zika – that is, to more readily credit false propositions relating to Zika risks when
doing so was identity-afﬁrming rather than identity-threatening. Not only did experi-
mentally treated subjects display a greater willingness to endorse false accounts of
the source of the current Zika public health emergency when assigned to the condi-
tion in which Zika fear was identity-congruent. They also evinced a disturbing
inability even to recognize when afﬁrming a false proposition – that Zika infection
always results in symptoms within a short period of time, for example – actually un-
derestimated the true risk posed by the virus and the utility of personal precautions
to avoid infection.
The probability that subjects would ‘misfear’ Zika in this fashion did not abate
but instead intensiﬁed as their science comprehension capacity increased. This form
of ‘motivated system 2 reasoning’ (Kahan, forthcoming-b) is the telltale sign that
individuals are using their reason to form identity-convergent rather than truth-
convergent beliefs. The power of the experimental manipulation to excite this form
of information processing constitutes the study’s most compelling proof of the con-
jecture (cf. Toplak and Stanovich 2003; Stanovich and West 2007) that culturally
antagonistic memes explain the seemingly chaotic pattern of evidence-resistant pub-
lic conﬂicts over risk across place and time.
The experiment had no meaningful impact, however, on subjects’ perceptions of
the appropriateness of policy interventions to contain Zika risks. This result was
more consistent with the prediction made by the AM-immunity hypothesis.
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How much, then, should this result discount the weight of the evidence overall
in support of the AM-vulnerability hypothesis? That is for readers to decide, of
course. But we would suggest the answer is ‘not much.’
The public’s exposure to information on Zika has been uneven. There is a high
likelihood that that they will have heard of the virus and its causal nexus with
microcephalic infants (Annenberg Public Policy Center 2016a). Formed on the basis
of communications much like those featured in the Public Health condition news
story, the affective response is likely to be one that inclines them to support for
public health interventions. This conclusion is consistent with the highly skewed
character of the responses we observed to our Zika policy items.
The sorts of communications featured in the Global Warming and Immigrant
conditions, in contrast, are relatively new and, while steadily growing in frequency,
deﬁnitely not yet a central feature of communications on the virus in the media or
elsewhere. Accordingly, there is little reason to expect such argumentative tropes to
have been widely or repeatedly observed by the subjects. Indeed, if they had been,
one would expect the experimental treatment to have little or no impact on the
subjects affective responses to Zika (Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Druckman
2012).
The affect heuristic implies that information exposure that succeeds in changing
affect should be expected to change individuals’ acceptance of information about a
societal risk, and hence their policy preferences relating to it. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to believe that this shift will occur over time and over successive
affect-shaping and affect-reinforcing information exposures.
By administering a single dose of such information, the experimental manipula-
tion in this study had a demonstrable effect on Zika affect and related forms of infor-
mation processing. To be sure, it didn’t generate a comparable shift in policy
preferences. But if affective orientations on Zika are as unformed and labile as the
subjects’ responsiveness to our study’s experimental manipulation suggests, then
one might expect persistent exposures to such communications outside the lab to
polarize members of the public on policy interventions over time as well.
Indeed, such an effect might well be predicted by another important dynamic:
the social ampliﬁcation of risk (Kasperson et al. 1988). Fortifying accounts that
focus only on individual cognition, the social ampliﬁcation of risk systematizes the
contribution that various forms of social inﬂuence make to transmission of risk per-
ceptions and resulting public risk controversies. In particular, this theory features
how feedback effects inherent in the media and other forms of communication com-
pound processes like the ones contemplated by the affect heuristic and the cultural
cognition thesis. Unrepresented by anything in this particular study design, social
ampliﬁcation might be expected to magnify the real-world counterparts of effects
observed in the lab, making their ultimate impact on policy interventions even more
probable.
For sure, this interpretation ought to be engaged critically! But critically engag-
ing it means considering it in relation not to an inferentially barren ‘null hypothesis’
but in relation to the practically signiﬁcant alternative conjecture that informed our
study design: the AM-immunity hypothesis, which posits that risk conﬂict is inher-
ent in the properties of risk sources, combined perhaps with more deep-seated social
inﬂuences, and thus not amenable to being readily manipulated by exposure to cul-
turally antagonistic memes. That hypothesis predicted not only that the subjects’
policy preferences would be unaffected but also that their affective orientations and
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information processing wouldn’t be either. The experimental results strongly refuted
any such expectation.
4.1.2. Miserly processing: an alternative explanation?
Of course, the greater consistency of the results with the AM-vulnerability than with
the AM-immunity hypotheses leaves open the possibility that a third theory – one
that is unconnected to the AH-CCT model but that makes the same predictions for
our experiment – might still be true. We can think of at least one such rival that
deserves mention here. Highly inﬂuential in political science, this position treats
individual citizens as ‘miserly information processors’ who resort to one or another
set of heuristic substitutes to compensate for their incapacity to work out which
policy positions best ﬁt their values and interests (e.g. Zaller 1992).
Arguably the most important heuristic cue for such citizens is the partisan iden-
tity of information sources (Mondak 1993; Lau and Redlawski 2001). In our study,
arguments were advanced by parties conspicuously identiﬁed with issues of clear
partisan import – namely, global warming and immigration. On the ‘miserly proces-
sor’ account, then, one might view the results of our study as evincing the disposi-
tion of citizens to give decisive weight to the views of partisan-aligned advocates,
making it unnecessary to invoke identity-protective cognition, the affect heuristic, or
the role we have attributed to antagonistic cultural memes in determining the object
and valence of affective appraisals of risk.
Certain features of our study cast doubt on this view. For one thing, subjects of
opposing political orientations did not respond to the experimental stimulus in the
manner just described: as we discuss in Appendix C, the results we have reported
cannot be reproduced by substituting left–right political outlooks for cultural world-
views.
But more importantly still, the experimental effects were not attributable to mis-
erly information processing. The ‘miserly processor’ position sees reliance on cues
such as source credibility and group inﬂuences as ‘heuristic substitutes’ for
conscious, effortful information processing, and thus predicts attenuation of partisan-
source effects in cognitively sophisticated actors (Kam 2005). The culturally biased
information processing effects observed in our study, however, were strongest
among the cognitively most proﬁcient subjects. This result is more in accord with
the view that sees memes as a switch that substitutes identity-protection for truth-
seeking as the object of rational information processing (Toplak and Stanovich
2003; Stanovich and West 2008; Macpherson and Stanovich 2007).
But we do not in fact see these arguments as furnishing deceive ‘proof’ against
the ‘miserly processor’ position. It is in the nature of the inductive logic undergird-
ing empirical inquiry that results will always be underdetermined with reference to
the universe of mechanisms that could account for them. Accordingly, at any given
time the pragmatic empiricist can never do more than adjudicate the relative plausi-
bility of subsets of serious contenders. This study was aimed at assessing the relative
plausibility of alternative accounts of how affect and identity-protective cognition
are activated, not the plausibility of accounts that assume those processes, on the
hand, and the ‘miserly processing’ position, on the other. Rather than mine this
study for additional grounds for deciding between the AH-CCT model and the ‘mis-
erly processor’ theory, then, it would make more sense be to construct additional
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studies self-consciously constructed to test the relative plausibility of these opposing
accounts.
4.2. Normative
In our view, the normative signiﬁcance of the experimental results reported in this
paper is straightforward: the advent of advocacy that opportunistically bundles Zika
with positions on culturally fraught issues should itself be treated as a serious threat
to public health. From climate change to the HPV vaccine, from gun control to
nuclear power, identity-protective cognition – the signature reasoning pathology
associated with the AH-CCT Model – has demonstrated itself to be a poisonous
inﬂuence on public engagement with valid decision-relevant science. Because iden-
tity-protective cognition feeds on the bundling of science information with culturally
recriminatory rhetoric (Gollust et al. 2010; Bolsen and Druckman 2015; Bolsen,
Druckman, and Cook 2014), anyone who observes the advent of such rhetoric in
connection with a novel risk source, such as the Zika virus, should be alarmed.
The dangers that such advocacy posed to the HPV vaccine in the US were antici-
pated and even empirically modeled before they actually ripened into reason-eviscer-
ating conditions of cultural conﬂict (Kahan 2013a). No one acted, and to this day
the stigma that that vaccine bears continues to discourage proper public engagement
with this critical form of decision-relevant science. Similar passivity in the face of
all we know – including the accumulated insight of the study of science communica-
tion, the outcome of episodes like the HPV vaccine ﬁasco in the US, and the antici-
patory empirical modeling presented in this study – would, in our view, constitute a
form of recklessness on the part of those charged with protecting the public health.
4.3. Prescriptive
The prescriptive implications of our study, we believe, are both patently obvious
and painfully obscure. What’s obvious, then, is that actors in a position to do so
should combat the emergence of antagonistic memes. What’s far from obvious, how-
ever, is who is in a position to do what and how to effectuate that end. Without any
pretense to completeness, we offer some reﬂections on the latter issue.
Government agencies and other risk communicators are not in a position to pro-
hibit behavior generative of antagonistic memes, certainly. But they are in a position
to boost the immunity of the body politic to the impact of them.
As we have emphasized, the AH-CCT Model does not naturally lead to polariza-
tion. On the contrary, under the Model diverse citizens ordinarily converge on the
best available evidence as a result of their immersion in group interactions that
feature the opinions and behavior of group members situated to recognize valid sci-
entiﬁc information. The AH-CCT Model predicts cultural division only if antagonis-
tic memes take root, fusing positions on risk to opposing group identities.
It follows that the most effective way to protect the science communication
environment from culturally antagonistic memes is for government and other profes-
sional risk communicators to intervene early on in the career of the public’s affective
assessment of a putative risk source. The affect heuristic counsels that individuals
will conform information to their affective appraisals. Thus, where culturally uni-
form affective appraisals are already deep and settled, one can expect the public to
be relatively unaffected by communications that contain the sorts of argumentative
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tropes that can evolve into antagonistic memes. Such appraisals, the AH-CCT Model
implies, are formed in the context of relatively insular interactions among individu-
als who share basic cultural outlooks. Accordingly, professional risk communicators
stand a reasonable chance in beating antagonistic-meme-generating communications
to the punch – or in turning such punches into at best glancing blows – if they seed
these affect-shaping afﬁnity groups with the sorts of information likely to align their
members’ sensibilities with the best available scientiﬁc evidence.
This is a recommendation that is admittedly general. But it can still furnish guid-
ance, in the form of an injunction to act decisively and quickly in a case like that of
the Zika virus, where evidence shows that the public’s sensibilities remain largely
unformed. It can also furnish the basis for a research program that focuses on formu-
lating and testing hypotheses that can help validate such a prescription and sharpen
it into progressively more determinate directives.
5. Conclusion: antagonistic memes in the ‘Liberal Republic of Science’
In the course of exploring a more general theory, we presented evidence that the
public’s comprehension of the best available evidence on a particular public health
threat – the spread of the Zika virus – is at risk of being compromised by a distinc-
tive science communication pathology. The infectious agent of this pathology con-
sists in culturally antagonistic memes fabricated and propagated by advocates
seeking to cash in on the public fear of Zika by bundling it with rhetoric calculated
to excite contempt for those who oppose them on culturally charged issues like
illegal immigration and climate change. When exposed to communications incorpo-
rating such rhetoric, culturally diverse study subjects formed polarizing affective
reactions that in turn degraded their capacity to make sense of valid public health
information.
Obviously, we don’t know whether what we observed in the lab will occur out-
side of it. But we believe that the best way to reduce the risk of this outcome is to
recognize that the proliferation of the sorts of rhetorical opportunism featured in this
study is a public health threat in its own right. Public health agencies and individual
public health professionals; professional health communicators and science journal-
ists; responsible advocacy groups and ordinary citizens who support the causes
being irresponsibly advanced by these means – all should oppose such forms of
discourse. Had individuals and groups situated to do something recognized the con-
sequences of the entanglement of decision-relevant science in antagonistic cultural
meanings and taken coordinated action to avert this state, at least some of the cur-
rent controversies featuring identity-protective cognition we are convinced, could
have been avoided (Kahan 2013a).
Indeed, the failure of democratic societies to equip themselves to contain the
threat posed by antagonistic memes exposes their citizens to recurring public health
threats the magnitude of which rivals and in many cases exceeds those associated
with the ﬁrst Zika public health emergency. The toll this incapacity has exacted
already includes the stiﬂing of informed public engagement with science relevant to
a variety of consequential hazards. The perpetuation of this deﬁcit is certain to cost
democratic societies the beneﬁt of innumerable additional scientiﬁc insights, too,
whether or not the threat that antagonistic memes pose to the communication of the
best evidence on Zika materializes. In this sense, the public health crisis posed by
Zika also furnishes an opportunity to begin to learn the critical lessons necessary for
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liberal democracies to annihilate this welfare-crippling science communication
pathology.
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Notes
1. Cultural cognition is typically understood as a species of motivated reasoning (Hastorf
and Cantril 1954; Kunda 1990) that manifests itself in the tendency to selectively credit
evidence in a manner consistent with predispositions protective of group identity (Kahan
2011; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2015). Paralleling work on how cultural outlooks
shape societal risk perceptions, there is a rich political science literature on ‘ideologi-
cally motivated reasoning,’ in which individuals’ right–left political outlooks orient
information processing (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2013). In our view, cultural worldviews
and left–right political outlooks are not alternative accounts of what guides motivated
reasoning in relation to social risks and related policy-relevant facts. Rather they are
merely alternative frameworks for measuring the latent, group-related disposition that is
posited to be driving unconscious, identity-protective information processing. Which
framework – cultural worldviews or left–right political outlooks – should be used turns,
in our opinion, on pragmatic criteria relating to the relative contribution one or the other
makes to explanation, prediction, and prescription for the subject matter at hand (Kahan,
forthcoming-b). Elaboration of this position, along with alternative data analyses that
substitute left–right political outlooks for cultural worldviews in relation the experimen-
tal results reported in this paper, are presented in Appendix C.
2. For information on YouGov’s sampling and stratiﬁcation methods, see Ansolabehere
and Rivers (2013).
3. The stimulus is reproduced in Appendix A.
4. The correlation was measured in the responses of subjects assigned to the Public Health
condition to minimize any potential confounding identity-protective cognition effects
associated with exposure to the charged themes featured in the news stories in the
Global Warming and Immigrant conditions.
5. Although the hypotheses in this study, then, focus predominantly on divisions between
Hierarchical Individualists and Egalitarian Communitarians, the Cultural Cognition The-
sis does not imply that only individuals with these outlooks will ever polarize over risks.
For studies in which Hierarchical Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists divide,
see Kahan et al. (2012, 2016); and Kahan, Braman, Monahan, et al. (2010).
6. See Appendix A. GWSPREAD and IMSPREAD were omitted from the MISFEARING
scale to assure that any observed effect in the Global Warming and Immigrant condi-
tions was not being driven by responses solely to these two items.
7. All experimental-effect estimates referred to in the text and illustrated graphically reﬂect
univariate and multivariate regression models, which for expositional convenience are
reproduced in Appendix B and are labeled ‘Table Bx.’
8. All ‘±’ margins of error reﬂect a 0.95 level of conﬁdence.
9. Not surprisingly, the experimental manipulation polarized Hierarch Individualist and
Egalitarian Communitarian subjects in the expected directions on GWSPREAD (‘Global
warming has caused the Zika virus to spread to the United States’) and IMMSPREAD
(‘Immigrants entering the United States illegally have caused the spread of the Zika
virus to the United States’). As noticeable as these effects were, they did not alone
account for the degradation in ZLIT scores. When those items were removed from the
26 D.M. Kahan et al.
scale, scores remained on average 0.10 SDs (±0.08) higher for subjects assigned to
Public Health than did scores for subjects assigned to either to Global Warming or
Immigrant.
10. Items underscored type were included in the Misfearing Scale.
References
Abruzzo, S. 2016. “Illegals, not American Travelers, may be Bringing Zika to our Shores.”
Brooklyn Daily, February 5. http://www.brooklyndaily.com/stories/2016/6/all-britview-
zika-virus-2016-02-05-bd.html.
Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2016a. Annenberg Science Knowledge Survey. http://www.
annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/science-communication/ask/.
Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2016b. More than 4 in 10 Mistakenly Think Zika is Fatal,
Symptoms are Noticeable. Annenberg Science Knowledge Survey, March 10. http://www.
annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/more-than-4-in-10-mistakenly-think-zika-is-fatal-and-
symptoms-are-noticeable/.
Ansolabehere, S., and D. Rivers. 2013. “Cooperative Survey Research.” Annual Review of
Political Science 16: 307–329.
Balkin, J. M. 1998. Cultural Software. New Haven, CT: Yale.
Blackmore, S. 2000. The Meme Machine. Oxford: OUP.
Bolsen, T., and J. N. Druckman. 2015. “Counteracting the Politicization of Science.” Journal
of Communication 65 (5): 745–769. doi:10.1111/jcom.12171.
Bolsen, T., J. Druckman, and F. L. Cook. 2013. “The Effects of the Politicization of Science
on Public Support for Emergent Technologies.” Institute for Policy Research
Northwestern University Working Paper Series, Evanston, IL, USA.
Bolsen, T., J. N. Druckman, and F. L. Cook. 2014. “The Inﬂuence of Partisan Motivated
Reasoning on Public Opinion.” Political Behavior 36: 235–262.
Bolsen, T., J. N. Druckman, and F. L. Cook. 2015. “Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy Advi-
sors’ Beliefs about Global Warming.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 658: 271–295.
Cohen, G. L. 2003. “Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Inﬂuence on Politi-
cal Beliefs.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (5): 808–822.
Corsi, J. 2016. “Zika Virus Joins List of Diseases Brought by Illegals.” WND, February 1.
http://www.wnd.com/2016/02/zika-virus-joins-list-of-diseases-brought-by-illegals/#!
Damasio, A. R. 2010. Self Comes to Mind : Constructing the Conscious Brain. New York:
Pantheon Books.
Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory. 2011. Cultural Cognition Worldview
Scales (CCWS). http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Cultural_Cognition_Worldview_Scales.html.
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp, and G. G. Wagner. 2011.
“Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Behavioral Consequences.”
Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (3): 522–550. doi:10.1111/j.1542-
4774.2011.01015.x.
Douglas, M. 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.
New York: Praeger.
Douglas, M. 1970. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. London: Barrie & Rockliff
the Cresset P.
Douglas, M. 1999. “The Depoliticisation of Risk.” In Implicit Meanings: Selected Essays in
Anthropology, edited by Mary Douglas, 218–230. London: Routledge.
Douglas, M., and A. B. Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of
Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Druckman, J. N. 2012. “The Politics of Motivation.” Critical Review 24: 199–216.
Druckman, J. N., J. Fein, and T. J. Leeper. 2012. “A Source of Bias in Public Opinion
Stability.” American Political Science Review 106: 430–454.
Elster, J. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Erickson, Erick. 2011. “Let’s Use Teenage Girls as Lab Rats for a Monopoly.” RedSate,
August 17. http://www.redstate.com/erick/2011/08/17/lets-use-teenage-girls-as-lab-rats-
for-a-monopoly/.
Journal of Risk Research 27
Evans, A. T., E. Peters, A. A. Strasser, L. F. Emery, K. M. Sheerin, and D. Romer. 2015.
“Graphic Warning Labels Elicit Affective and Thoughtful Responses from Smokers:
Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial.” PLoS ONE 10: e0142879.
Ferrari, Matteo. 2009. Risk Perception, Culture, and Legal Change : A Comparative Study
on Food Safety in the Wake of the Mad Cow Crisis. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Finucane, M. L., A. Alhakami, P. Slovic, and S. M. Johnson. 2000. “The Affect Heuristic in
Judgments of Risks and Beneﬁts.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13: 1–17.
Fowler, E. F., and S. E. Gollust. 2015. “The Content and Effect of Politicized Health
Controversies.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
658: 155–171.
Ganzach, Y., S. Ellis, A. Pazy, and Tali Ricci-Siag. 2008. “On the Perception and
Operationalization of Risk Perception.” Judgment and Decision Making 3: 317–324.
Gaskell, G., M. W. Bauer, J. Durant, and N. C. Allum. 1999. “Worlds Apart? The Reception
of Genetically Modiﬁed Foods in Europe and the US.” Science 285 (5426): 384–387.
Gillis, J. 2016. “In Zika Epidemic, a Warning on Climate Change.” New York Times, A6.
Gollust, S. E., A. F. Dempsey, P. M. Lantz, P. A. Ubel, and E. F. Fowler. 2010. “Controversy
Undermines Support for State Mandates on the Human Papillomavirus Vaccine.” Health
Affairs 29: 2041–2046.
Gollust, S. E., S. M. LoRusso, R. H. Nagler, and E. F. Fowler. 2015. “Understanding the
Role of the News Media in HPV Vaccine Uptake in the United States: Synthesis and
Commentary.” Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics 23: e143–e151.
Goodman, Ellen. 2015. “Abstinance-only Crowd Laments Concern Breakthrough.” Boston
Globe, November 14. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-11-14/news/0511140054_1_
abstinence-papilloma-virus-vaccine.
Greene, J. D. 2013. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.
New York: Penguin Press.
Gusﬁeld, J. R. 1968. “On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating
Deviance.” California Law Review 56: 54–73.
Gusﬁeld, Joseph R. 1993. “The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health.” In Smoking Pol-
icy: Law, Politics, and Culture, edited by Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hallman, W., C. Cuite, and X. Morin. 2013. Public Perceptions of Labeling Genetically mod-
iﬁed Foods. Working Paper 2013–2001. New Brunswick, NJ, USA: Rutgers School of
Environmental and Biological Sciences, http://humeco.rutgers.edu/documents_PDF/news/
GMlabelingperceptions.pdf.
Hamilton, L. C. 2011. “Education, Politics and Opinions about Climate Change Evidence for
Interaction Effects.” Climatic Change 104: 231–242.
Hamilton, L. C., M. J. Cutler, and A. Schaefer. 2012. “Public Knowledge and Concern about
Polar-region Warming.” Polar Geography 35: 155–168.
Hastorf, A. H., and H. Cantril. 1954. “They Saw a Game; A Case Study.” The Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology 49: 129–134.
Jamieson, K. H., and B. W. Hardy. 2014. “Leveraging Scientiﬁc Credibility about Arctic Sea
Ice Trends in a Polarized Political Environment.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 111: 13598–13605.
Jost, J. T., E. P. Hennes, and H. Lavine. 2013. “‘Hot’ Political Cognition: Its Self-, Group,
and System-serving Purposes.” In Oxford handbook of social cognition, edited by D.
Carlston, 851–875. New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, B. 2016. “Dem Leaders: Climate Change Stoking Zika, Which could b ‘Greater
Threat’ than Ebola.” PJ Media, April 26. https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/2016/04/
26/dem-leaders-climate-change-stoking-zika-which-could-be-greater-threat-than-ebola/.
Kahan, D. 2010. “Fixing the Communications Failure.” Nature 463: 296–297.
Kahan, D. M. 2011. “The Supreme Court 2010 Term – Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law.” Harvard Law Review
126: 1–77.
Kahan, D. M. 2012. “Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk.” In
Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications
of Risk, edited by R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, S. Roeser, and M. Peterson, 725–760.
London: Springer.
28 D.M. Kahan et al.
Kahan, D. M. 2013a. “A Risky Science Communication Environment for Vaccines.” Science
342: 53–54.
Kahan, D. M. 2013b. “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reﬂection.” Judgment
and Decision Making 8: 407–424.
Kahan, D. M. 2015a. “Climate-science Communication and the Measurement Problem.”
Political Psychology 36: 1–43.
Kahan, D. M. 2015b. “What is the ‘Science of Science Communication’?” Journal of Science
Communication 14: 1–12.
Kahan, D. M. 2016. “‘Ordinary Science Intelligence’: A Science-comprehension Measure for
Study of Risk and Science Communication, with Notes on Evolution and Climate
Change.” Journal of Risk Research. Advance online. doi:10.1080/13669877.2016.
1148067.
Kahan, D. M. Forthcoming-a. “On the Sources of Ordinary Science Knowledge and Extraor-
dinary Science Ignorance.” In Oxford Handbook of the Science of Science Communica-
tion, edited by K. H. Jamieson and D. Scheufele. Oxford: OUP.
Kahan, D. M. Forthcoming-b. “The Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm.” Emerging
Trends in Social & Behavioral Sciences. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2703011
Kahan, D. M., and P. Slovic. 2006. “Cultural Evaluations of Risk: ‘Values’ or ‘Blunders’?”
Harvard Law Review Forum 119: 166–172.
Kahan, D. M., P. Slovic, D. Braman, and J. Gastil. 2006. “Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk.” Harvard Law Review 119: 1071–1109.
Kahan, D., D. Braman, G. Cohen, J. Gastil, and P. Slovic. 2010. “Who Fears the HPV
Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural
Cognition.” Law and Human Behavior 34: 501–516.
Kahan, D. M., D. Braman, J. Monahan, L. Callahan, and E. Peters. 2010. “Cultural Cognition
and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws.” Law and Human Behav-
ior 34:118–140.
Kahan, D. M., H. Jenkins-Smith, and D. Braman. 2011. “Cultural Cognition of Scientiﬁc
Consensus.” Journal of Risk Research 14: 147–174.
Kahan, D. M., D. A. Hoffman, D. Braman, D. Evans, and J. J. Rachlinski. 2012. “They Saw
a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-conduct Distinction.” Stanford Law
Review 64: 851–906.
Kahan, D. M., D. A. Hoffman, D. Evans, N. Devins, E. A. Lucci, and K. Cheng. 2016.
“‘Ideology’ or ‘Situation Sense’? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning
and Professional Judgment.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 164: 349–439.
Kahan, D. M., E. Peters, E. Dawson, and P. Slovic. Forthcoming. “Motivated Numeracy and
Enlightened Self Government.” Behavioural Public Policy.
Kahan, D. M., E. Peters, M. Wittlin, P. Slovic, L. L. Ouellette, D. Braman, and G. Mandel.
2012. “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate
Change Risks.” Nature Climate Change 2: 732–735.
Kam, C. D. 2005. “Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences.”
Political Behavior 27: 163–182.
Kasperson, R. E., O. Renn, P. Slovic, H. S. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. X. Kasperson, and
S. Ratick. 1988. “The Social Ampliﬁcation of Risk: A Conceptual Framework.” Risk
Analysis 8: 177–187.
Keil, F. C. 2003. “Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality.” Trends in Cog-
nitive Sciences 7: 368–373.
Keil, F. C. 2010. “The Feasibility of Folk Science.” Cognitive Science 34: 826–862.
Keil, F. C. 2012. “Running on Empty? How Folk Science Gets by with Less.” Current Direc-
tions in Psychological Science 21: 329–334.
King, G., M. Tom, and J. Wittenberg. 2000. “Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Inter-
pretation and Presentation.” American Journal of Political Science 44: 347–361.
Kunda, Z. 1990. “The Case of Motivated Reasoning.” Psychological Bulletin 108: 480–498.
Lau, R. R., and D. P. Redlawski. 2001. “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuris-
tics in Political Decision Making.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 951–971.
Lessig, L. 1995. “The Regulation of Social Meaning.” University of Chicago Law Review
62: 943–1045.
Journal of Risk Research 29
Lodge, M., and C. S. Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lord, C. G., L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper. 1979. “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 37 (11): 2098–2109.
Macpherson, R., and K. E. Stanovich. 2007. “Cognitive Ability, Thinking Dispositions, and
Instructional Set as Predictors of Critical Thinking.” Learning and Individual Differences
17 (2): 115–127.
Malkin, M. 2016. “Chicken Little Chuckie Schumer: America’s Disease-ﬁghting Phony.”
National Review, February 3. www.nationalreview.com/article/430713/zika-virus-illegal-
immigration-connection.
Margolis, H. 1987. Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Margolis, H. 1996. Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environ-
mental Issues. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
McFadden, B. R., and J. L. Lusk. 2016. “What Consumers Don’t Know about Genetically
Modiﬁed Food, and How That Affects Beliefs.” The FASEB Journal. Advance Online.
doi:10.1096/fj.201600598.
McKibben, B. 2016. “The Zika Virus Foreshadows our Dystopian Climate Future.” The
Guardian, Jan 25. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/25/zika-virus-
brazil-dystopian-climate-future.
Mercer, G. 2016. “The Link between Zika and Climate Change.” Atlantic. http://www.theat
lantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/zika-and-climate-change/470643.
Milman, O. 2016. “Climate Change may have helped Spread Zika Virus, According to WHO
Scientists.” Guardian, February 11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/11/cli
mate-change-zika-virus-south-central-america-mosquitos
Mondak, J. J. 1993. “Public Opinion and Heuristic Processing of Source Cues.” Political
Behavior 15: 167–192.
Nathanson, C. A. 1999. “Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The Case of
Smoking and Guns.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24: 421–488.
Page, Christina. 2006. “The Virgin Vaccine.” Nerve, June 28. http://www.nerve.com/dis
patches/cpage/virginvaccine.
Peters, E. M., B. Burraston, and C. K. Mertz. 2004. “An Emotion-based Model of Risk
Perception and Stigma Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reac-
tivity, Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma.”
Risk Analysis 24: 1349–1367.
Peters, E., I. Lipkus, and M. A. Diefenbach. 2006. “The Functions of Affect in Health Com-
munications and in the Construction of Health Preferences.” Journal of Communication
56 (S1): S140–S162.
Peters, E., and P. Slovic. 1996. “The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Disposi-
tions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power.” Journal of Applied Social
Psychology 26: 1427–1453.
Poortinga, W., and N. F. Pidgeon. 2005. “Trust in Risk Regulation: Cause or Consequence of
the Acceptability of GM Food?” Risk Analysis 25: 199–209.
Raftery, A. E. 1995. “Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research.” Sociological Methodol-
ogy 25: 111–163.
Rayner, S. 1992. “Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis.” In Social Theories of Risk, edited by
S. Krimsky and D. Golding, 83–115. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Renn, O., and B. Rohrmann. 2000. Cross-cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical
Studies. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing.
Romer, D., and M. Hennessy. 2007. “A Biosocial-affect Model of Adolescent Sensation
Seeking: The Role of Affect Evaluation and Peer-group Inﬂuence in Adolescent Drug
Use.” Prevention Science 8: 89–101.
Sato, Kyoko. 2007. Meanings of Genetically Modiﬁed Food and Policy Change and Persis-
tence: The Cases of France, Japan and the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
30 D.M. Kahan et al.
Sherman, D. K., and G. L. Cohen. 2002. “Accepting Threatening Information: Self-afﬁrma-
tion and the Reduction of Defensive Biases.” Current Directions in Psychological
Science 11: 119–123.
Sherman, D. K., and G. L. Cohen. 2006. “The Psychology of Self-defense: Self-afﬁrmation
Theory.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38: 183–242.
Slovic, P. 2010. The Feeling of Risk : New Perspectives on Risk Perception. Washington,
DC: Earthscan.
Slovic, P. 2000. The Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan Publications.
Slovic, P., M. L. Finucane, E. Peters, and D. G. MacGregor. 2004. “Risk as Analysis and
Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality.” Risk
Analysis 24: 311–322.
Slovic, P., J. Flynn, C. K. Mertz, M. Poumadere, and C. Mays. 2000. “Nuclear Power and
the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and the United States.” In
Cross-cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies, edited by O. Renn and B.
Rohrmann, 55–102. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Slovic, P., and E. Peters. 1998. “The Importance of Worldviews in Risk Perception.” Risk
Decision and Policy 3: 165–170.
Stanovich, K. E. 2009. “Distinguishing the Reﬂective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds:
Is It Time for a Tri-process Theory.” In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, edited
by Jonathan Evans and Keith Frankish, 55–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E. 2011. Rationality and the Reﬂective Mind. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Stanovich, K. E., and R. F. West. 2007. “Natural Myside Bias is Independent of Cognitive
Ability.” Thinking & Reasoning 13 (3): 225–247.
Stanovich, K. E., and R. F. West. 2008. “On the Failure of Cognitive Ability to Predict
Myside and One-sided Thinking Biases.” Thinking and Reasoning 14: 129–167.
Sunstein, C. R. 2006. “Misfearing: A Reply.” Harvard Law Review 119: 1110–1125.
Taormino, Tristan. 2006. “The Slut Shot.” Village Voice, August 15. http://www.vil
lagevoice.com/news/the-slut-shot-6427195.
Toplak, M. E., and K. E. Stanovich. 2003. “Associations between Myside Bias on an
Informal Reasoning Task and Amount of Post-secondary Education.” Applied Cognitive
Psychology 17 (7): 851–860.
Wagenmakers, E.-J. 2007. “A Practical Solution to the Pervasive Problems of p Values.”
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 14 (5): 779–804.
Weber, E. U., A.-R. Blais, and N. E. Betz. 2002. “A Domain-speciﬁc Risk-attitude Scale:
Measuring Risk Perceptions and Risk Behaviors.” Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making 15: 263–290.
Westfall, J., L. Van Boven, C. M. Judd, and J. R. Chambers. 2015. “Perceiving Political
Polarization in the United States Party Identity Strength and Attitude Extremity
Exacerbate the Perceived Partisan Divide.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 10 (2):
145–158.
Xue, W., D. W. Hine, N. M. Loi, E. B. Thorsteinsson, and W. J. Phillips. 2014. “Cultural
Worldviews and Environmental Risk Perceptions: A Meta-analysis.” Journal of Environ-
mental Psychology 40: 249–258.
Zaller, J. R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Journal of Risk Research 31
Appendix A. Study instrument
A1. Experimental stimulus
A1.1. Public Health news story
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A1.2. Global Warming news story
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A1.3. Immigrant news story
A2. Outcome measures
A2.1. ZAFFECT
Now we’d like to ask you your opinions on this issue.
We’d like to get your views on the risks posed by the Zika virus.
(1) ZIKA_ISRPM. How much risk do you believe the Zika virus poses to human
health in the United States? [0 ‘no risk at all’; 1 ‘Very low risk’; 2 ‘Low risk’; 3
‘Between low and moderate risk’; 4 ‘Moderate risk’; 5 ‘Between moderate and high
risk’; 6 ‘High risk’; 7 ‘Very high risk’].
(2) ZIKAWORRY. How concerned are you that the Zika virus will spread to where you
live?[ 0 ‘not at all concerned’; 1 ‘slightly concerned’; 2 ‘between slightly and moder-
ately concerned’ 3 ‘moderately concerned’ 4 ‘Between moderately and very con-
cerned’ 5 ‘very concerned’].
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A2.2. ZLIT10
Now we’d like to get your views on the conclusions supported by the scientiﬁc evidence currently
available on Zika. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each of these state-
ments.
Randomize order
(1) CASUAL. A person can catch Zika from sitting next to someone who has been
infected by the Zika virus.
(2) SEXUAL. A woman can catch Zika from having sex with a man who has been
infected by the Zika virus.
(3) BITE. A person can catch Zika from being bitten by a mosquito that is carrying
the Zika virus.
(4) SPRAY. A person can catch Zika from drinking water sprayed with a chemical
used to stop the spread of mosquitoes.
(5) MICRO. A pregnant woman who is infected with the Zika virus is more likely to
have a baby with an unusually small head and brain.
(6) GMSPREAD. The Zika virus was introduced by a genetically modiﬁed form of
mosquito.
(7) SYMPTOMS. An individual who has been infected by the Zika virus will always
experience noticeable symptoms shortly after being infected.
(8) USOUTBREAK. There have been more reported cases of Zika in the United States
than in any other country.
(9) USMICRO. The number of cases of babies being born in the United States with
abnormally small heads and brains has increased in recent months.
(10) GWSPREAD. Global warming has caused the Zika virus to spread to the United
States.
(11) IMMSPREAD. Immigrants entering the United States illegally have caused the
spread of the Zika virus to the United States.
(12) LATINOUTBREAK. Right now Zika infections are concentrated in Brazil and
other central and south American countries.
(13) EUROUTBREAK. There is currently an outbreak of Zika infections in Europe.
Now we’d like to get your views on the Zika-related advice that public health
authorities are giving to people in various situations. Please indicate how strongly
you disagree or agree with each of these statements. [strongly Disagree, moder-
ately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]
(14) DIAGNOSED. Consider the case of a man has been diagnosed with a Zika infec-
tion.
In his case, public health authorities would recommend he SHOULD wait at
least six months before having sex without a condom.
(15) Consider the case of a man who has travelled to a location that is currently experi-
encing a high rate of Zika infections but is NOT experiencing symptoms after
returning. In his case, what would public health experts say:
NOSYMPTOM1. There is NO RISK that he can infect another person through
sexual intercourse.
NOSYMPTOM 2. There is NO RISK that he can infect a pregnant woman by
engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with her.
NOSYMPTOM3. He SHOULD either abstain from sex or use a condom for at
least eight weeks after returning from the area.
(16) Consider the case of a couple who is considering having children and who have
travelled to a location that is currently experiencing a high rate of Zika infections .
PREGDELY. In their case, they SHOULD wait at least eight weeks after
returning before the woman tries to become pregnant.
A2.3. ZPOLICY
Now we’d like to get your views on what sorts of public policies would help to prevent the
spread of Zika in the United States. P Please indicate how strongly you oppose or support the fol-
lowing policies [‘strongly oppose,’ ‘moderately oppose,’ ‘slightly oppose,’ ‘slightly support,’
‘moderately support,’ ‘strongly support’]
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Randomize order
(1) GW_POLICY. Policies to prevent global warming.
(2) IM_POLICY. Policies limiting immigration to the United States.
(3) GMM_POLICY. The release of genetically engineered mosquitos designed to inter-
fere with breeding and reproducing of Zika-carrying mosquitos.
(4) VACP_POLICY. Development of a vaccine against infection by the Zika virus.
(5) QUAR_POLICY. Quarantining individuals who enter United States after traveling to
parts of world now experiencing Zika outbreaks.
(6) LATE_ABORTION. Allowing abortions in the third trimester of pregnancy(during
or after the 27th week)if medical tests indicate that the fetus has a malformed head
and brain as a result of infection by the Zika virus.
(7) CONDUM_COVER. Mandating that employer-provided health insurance plans
cover the cost of condoms in regions in which Zika outbreaks are determined to be
occurring.
A3. Cultural worldview scales
Now we’d like to ask you your opinion on some social and moral issues.
[RANDOMIZE blocks and items within each block. each item separate page]
individualist-communitarianism scale (‘I’ items valenced toward individualism, ‘C’ towards
communitarianism)
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making decisions
for themselves. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly dis-
agree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]
(1) IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
(2) CHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting
themselves.
(3) IPROTECT. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from them-
selves.
(4) IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
(5) CPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if
that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
(6) CLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so
they don’t get in the way of what’s good for society.
Hierarchy-egalitarianism scale (‘H’ items valenced toward hierarchy, ‘E’ toward egalitarian-
ism)
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. How strongly
you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree,
slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]
(1) HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
(2) EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more
equal.
(3) ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the
poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
(4) EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our
society.
(5) HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals, and other groups don’t
want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
(6) HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.
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Appendix B. Multivariate regression models
Table B1. Experimental results for ZAFFECT: regression models.
Table B2. Experimental results for ZLIT: regression models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Global warming −0.12 (−2.40) −0.14 (−2.75) −0.14 (−2.87)
Immigrant 0.05 (1.04) 0.03 (0.56) 0.03 (0.50)
Hfac −0.03 (−1.23) −0.06 (−1.75)
Ifac −0.14 (−6.65) −0.16 (−4.59)
Hfac_x_GW −0.10 (−2.04)
Ifac_x_GW −0.04 (−0.83)
Hfac_x_Imm 0.23 (4.39)
Ifac_x_Imm 0.11 (2.16)
Constant 0.02 (0.64) 0.03 (0.72) 0.03 (0.74)
N 2399 2275 2275
R2 0.00 0.02 0.05
F-test (ΔR2) 23.2 (2, 2270) 13.7 (4, 2266)
Notes: Dependent variable is ZAFFECT. Unstandardized OLS regression coefﬁcients with t-statistics
denoted parenthetically. Bolded denotes that indicated predictor coefﬁcient, R2 or F-test statistic is
signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Global warming −0.14 (−2.68) −0.14 (−2.89) −0.14 (−2.86)
Immigrant −0.10 (−1.91) −0.08 (−1.63) −0.08 (−1.64)
Hfac −0.15 (−7.66) −0.20 (−5.55)
Ifac 0.20 (9.87) 0.22 (6.19)
Hfac_x_GW 0.07 (1.32)
Ifac_x_GW −0.04 (−0.85)
Hfac_x_Imm 0.07 (1.39)
Ifac_x_Imm −0.01 (−0.13)
Constant 0.10 (2.65) 0.09 (2.63) 0.09 (2.63)
N 2275 2275 2275
R2 0.00 0.06 0.07
F-statistic (ΔR2) 78.0 (2, 2270) 0.81 (4, 2266)
Notes: Dependent variable is ZAFFECT. Unstandardized OLS regression coefﬁcients with t-statistics
denoted parenthetically. Listwise deletion for missing data. Bolded denotes that indicated predictor
coefﬁcient, R2 or F-test statistic is signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
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Table B3. Experimental results for MISFEARING.
Table B4. Experimental results for ZPOLICY: regression models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Public health 0.09 (1.74) 0.08 (1.74) 0.09 (2.17) −0.04 (−0.84)
Global warming 0.12 (1.87) 0.09 (1.87) 0.12 (2.75) −0.11 (−2.60)
Hfac 0.08 (2.44) 0.01 (0.41) 0.11 (3.39)
Ifac −0.28 (−7.99) −0.18 (−5.73) −0.20 (−6.67)
Hf_x_ph 0.10 (1.96) 0.08 (1.91) −0.01 (−0.27)
If_x_ph −0.02 (−0.35) −0.02 (−0.57) 0.01 (0.24)
Hf_x_gw 0.11 (2.25) 0.11 (2.61) −0.08 (−1.76)
If_x_gw 0.02 (0.44) −0.01 (−0.19) 0.03 (0.67)
OSI −0.46 (−14.45) −0.45 (−13.96)
OSI_x_ph 0.04 (0.87) −0.01 (−0.26)
OSI_x_gw 0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.44)
Hf_x_osi −0.06 (−2.92) 0.01 (0.22)
If_x_osi 0.17 (9.08) 0.19 (6.00)
Hf_x_osi_x_ph −0.11 (−2.33)
If_x_osi_x_ph 0.01 (0.18)
hf_x_osi_x_gw −0.09 (−1.94)
If_x_osi_x_gw −0.07 (−1.61)
_cons −0.09 (2.44) −0.08 (−2.23) −0.11 (−3.49) 0.01 (0.47)
N 2272 2272 2272 2272
R2 0.00 0.10 0.31 0.32
F-statistic (ΔR2) 42.6(6, 2263) 142.8(5, 2258) 2.46 (4, 2254)
Notes: Dependent variable is ZAFFECT. Unstandardized OLS regression coefﬁcients with t-statistics
denoted parenthetically. Listwise deletion for missing data. Bolded denotes that indicated predictor coef-
ﬁcient, R2 or F-test statistic is signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Global Warming −0.01 (0.87) −0.02 (−0.40) −0.02 (−0.45)
Immigrant −0.01 (0.81) −0.02 (−0.40) −0.02 (−0.42)
Hfac −0.26 (−15.86) −0.24 (−8.06)
Ifac −0.21 (−12.66) −0.24 (−8.40)
Hfac_x_GW −0.03 (−0.84)
Ifac_x_GW 0.04 (1.07)
Hfac_x_Imm −0.02 (−0.56)
Ifac_x_Imm 0.05 (1.28)
Constant 0.01 (0.78) 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.50)
N 2183 2183 2183
R2 0.00 0.16 0.16
F-statistic (ΔR2) 207.6 (2, 2178) 0.7 (4, 2174)
Notes: Dependent variable is ZPOLICY. Unstandardized OLS regression coefﬁcients with t-statistics
denoted parenthetically. Listwise deletion for missing data. Bolded denotes that indicated predictor
coefﬁcient or F-statistic is signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
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Appendix C. Left–right political outlooks
In this appendix, we examine how substituting left–right political outlooks for cultural world-
views affects analysis of the experimental results. We do so to aid in evaluation of the relative util-
ity of left–−right political outlooks and cultural worldviews as measures of the orientating
disposition that unconsciously guides the motivated-reasoning effects observed in the study.
Motivated reasoning refers to the tendency of individuals to conform information to some goal
collateral to factual accuracy (Kunda 1990). Among these goals are the formation of perceptions
of risk and related policy-relevant facts that protect one’s standing within some identity-deﬁning
afﬁnity group (Sherman and Cohen 2006; Greene 2013; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, and Judd
2015). A latent variable, the disposition to form group-identity-convergent perceptions is variously
measured by left–right political outlooks (e.g. Cohen 2003; Kahan 2013b; Lodge and Taber 2013;
Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014) and by cultural worldviews (e.g. Kahan, Braman, Cohen,
et al. 2010; Bolsen et al. 2015). In our view, when used to test hypotheses about politically moti-
vated reasoning, left–right political outlooks and cultural worldviews are not alternative ‘theories’
but simply alternative measurement frameworks for operationalizing a single theory about the
sources of conﬂict over societal risk and related facts (Kahan, forthcoming-b), the choice between
which would be made on the basis of explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive power.
In the study reported in the paper, subjects’ left–right outlooks are measured with a standard-
ized scale (‘Left_right,’ α = 0.77) that aggregates their responses to two items:
(1) CONSERVATIVE. ‘How would you describe your political views? [1 = ‘very lib-
eral’; 2 = ‘liberal’; 3 = ‘moderate’; 4 = ‘conservative’; 5 = ‘very conservative’].
(2) PARTY_IDENTIFICATION. Generally speaking, do you usually think of your-
self as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?’; ‘[if Independent:] As an
independent, do you consider yourself to lean Democrat, lean Republican, or not
lean either way?’; ‘Would you call yourself a very strong Democrat/Republican or
a not very strong Democrat/Republican’ [1 = ‘Very strong Democrat’; 2 = ‘Demo-
crat’; 3 = ‘Lean Democrat’; 4 = ‘Intendent’; 5 = ‘Lean Republican’; 6 = ‘Republi-
can’; 7 = ‘Very strong Republican’].
The two regression models reported in Table C1 examine the experimental impact on the key out-
come variable ZAFFECT conditional on subjects’ left–right political outlooks and subjects’
cultural worldviews, respectively.
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Table C1. Multivariate regression analysis of experimental effects associated with cultural
worldview and left–right political outlook predictors.
Model 2, which uses left–right political outlooks, fails to register the full range of the effects
observed in Model 1, which uses the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales. In particular, the
‘ideologically motivated reasoning’ model fails to detect any evidence that assignment to Global
Warming (LR_x_GW: b = −0.06, t = −1.06) generated polarization in the subjects’ affective
responses relative to those in Public Health, where there was also no meaningful political polariza-
tion (Left_right: b = −0.08, t = −1.89). In Model 1, it is apparent that the Hierarch Individualists
and Egalitarian Communitarians were polarized in Public Health (sum of Hfac and Ifac:
b = −0.22, t = −4.40, p < 0.01) and that the degree of polarization among such subjects became
signiﬁcantly greater in Global Warming (sum of Hfac_x_GW + Ifac_x_GW: b = -0.16, t = −2.21,
p < 0.05). The failure of Left_right to detect these effects is a substantial defect in the explanatory
power of Model 1.
If one thought it was worthwhile to take a position on which disposition – left–right political
outlooks or cultural worldviews – accounts for the experimental result, one could assess the weight
of the evidence in favor of each possibility by comparing the models’ Bayes Information Criterion
(BIC) values. Such an analysis measures the relative likelihood of the observing the data if the
one or the other model is ‘true’ (Raftery 1995). The difference in the BICs of Mode1 2 and Model
1 is 54.1. This is a margin that signiﬁes that the observed data are astronomically more consistent
(e54/2 times more consistent, to be precise [Raftery 1995; Wagenmakers 2007]) with Model 1 than
with Model 2, signifying that the hypothesis ‘cultural worldviews account for the experimental
results’ is that many times more probable than the hypothesis that ‘political outlooks did.’
Model 1 Model 2
Global warming −0.15 (–2.96) −0.15 (–2.90)
Immigrant 0.02 (0.46) 0.04 (0.71)
Hfac −0.06 (–1.69)
Ifac −0.16 (–4.41)
Hfac_x_GW −0.11 (–2.08)
Ifac_x_GW −0.05 (–1.04)
Hfac_x_Imm 0.22 (4.33)
Ifac_x_Imm 0.10 (2.02)
Left_right −0.08(–1.89)
LR_x_GW −0.06 (–1.06)
LR_x_IMM 0.23 (4.01)
Constant 0.02 (0.60) 0.02 (0.49)
R2 0.05 0.02
BIC 6259.8 6305.7
ΔBIC +54.1
Notes: N = 2219. Outcome variable is ZAFFECT. Unstandardized OLS coefﬁcients, t-statistic denoted
parenthetically. Listwise deletion for missing data. Bolded denotes that indicated predictor is signiﬁcant
at p < 0.05.
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